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Articles
The Implausibility of Secrecy
Mark Fenster
Government secrecy frequently fails. Despite the executive branch’s obsessive hoarding of
certain kinds of documents and its constitutional authority to do so, recent high-profile
events—among them the WikiLeaks episode, the Obama administration’s infamous leak
prosecutions, and the widespread disclosure by high-level officials of flattering
confidential information to sympathetic reporters—undercut the image of a state that can
classify and control its information. The effort to control government information
requires human, bureaucratic, technological, and textual mechanisms that regularly
founder or collapse in an administrative state, sometimes immediately and sometimes
after an interval. Leaks, mistakes, and open sources all constitute paths out of the
government’s informational clutches. As a result, permanent, long-lasting secrecy of any
sort and to any degree is costly and difficult to accomplish.
This Article argues that information control is an implausible goal. It critiques some of
the foundational assumptions of constitutional and statutory laws that seek to regulate
information flows, while complicating and countering the extensive literature on secrecy,
transparency, and leaks that rest on those assumptions. By focusing on the functional issues
relating to government information and broadening its study beyond the much-examined
phenomenon of leaks, the Article catalogs and then illustrates the formal and informal
means by which information flows out of the state in a series of case studies. These
informal means play an especially important role in limiting both the ability of state actors
to keep secrets and the extent to which formal legal doctrines can control the flow of
government information. The same bureaucracy and legal regime that keep open
government laws from creating a transparent state also keep the executive branch from
creating a perfect informational dam. The Article draws several implications from this
descriptive, functional argument for legal reform and for the study of administrative and
constitutional law.

* Cone, Wagner, Nugent, Hazouri & Roth Tort Professor, Levin College of Law, University of
Florida. Many thanks to Nick Cullather, David Pozen, Rachel Rebouché, and Gary Ross for their
excellent comments and suggestions, and attendees at a workshop at the Copenhagen Business School
organized by Mykkel Flyverbom and Hans Krause Hansen. This Article spent a long time in
germination and several recent graduates provided some great research assistance, including Stephen
Bagge, Tara DiJohn, Megan Marlowe, and Lauren Millcarek. A summer research grant from the
Levin College of Law provided the time and support necessary to complete this project.
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Introduction
The federal government keeps an enormous number of secrets—far
1
2
too many, according to transparency advocates, the press, government

1. See, e.g., Steven Aftergood, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, 27 Yale L.
& Pol’y Rev. 399, 401–07 (2009) (a criticism of expansion of classification system by a leading open
government activist); Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing
Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 131, 133–34 (2006) (noting the excessive expansion of the
classification system after the 9/11 attacks).
2. See, e.g., Editorial, The Dangerous Comfort of Secrecy, N.Y. Times, July 12, 2005, at A20
(complaining that “the government’s addiction to secrecy is making an unnecessary casualty of the
openness vital to democracy”).
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commissions, and courts. The volume of classified records rises endlessly,
as does the cost of keeping them, resulting in an enormous secrecy
5
program that regulates the flow of information in the executive branch.
And yet, the executive branch’s efforts to keep secrets frequently fail, as a
series of worried government commissions have concluded over the past
6
several decades. The WikiLeaks episode constitutes the most spectacular
7
unauthorized disclosure of classified information, while the Obama
administration’s ongoing prosecution of leaks stands as an effort to
8
correct an apparently pervasive and perhaps unfixable problem. At the
same time, high-ranking officials regularly leak and plant classified
9
information for political gain, often with explicit or implicit authorization.

3. See, e.g., Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy,
S. Doc. No. 105-2 (1997) (noting the problem and the history of its study); The 9/11 Commission
Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States
417 (2004) (“Current security requirements nurture over-classification and excessive
compartmentation of information among agencies.”); Def. Dep’t Comm. on Classified Info., Report
to the Secretary of Defense by the Committee on Classified Information 2–6 (1956) (noting the
problems created by over-classification).
4. See, e.g., ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 389 F. Supp. 2d 547, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (identifying the
“unfortunate tendency of government officials to over-classify information”).
5. See infra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Deputy Inspector Gen. for Intelligence & Special Program Assessments, Report
on Sensitive Compartmented Information Leaks in the Department of Defense, Rep. No. 2012-056
(2012) (confirming unauthorized disclosures of classified national intelligence from Department of
Defense between December 2008 and December 2011); Comm’n on the Intelligence Capabilities of
the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the
United States 381–84 (2005) (summarizing classified version of report and previous government
studies that have identified noting “[h]undreds of serious press leaks” and calling for more aggressive
and coordinated investigation of leaks).
7. See generally Patricia L. Bellia, WikiLeaks and the Institutional Framework for National
Security Disclosures, 121 Yale L.J. 1448 (2012); Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks
and the Battle over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 311 (2011);
Mark Fenster, Disclosure’s Effects: WikiLeaks and Transparency, 97 Iowa L. Rev. 753 (2012).
8. Shane Harris, Plugging the Leaks, Washingtonian (July 21, 2010, 12:00 AM),
http://www.washingtonian.com/articles/people/plugging-the-leaks; Adam Liptak, A High-Tech War on
Leaks, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 2012, at SR5.
9. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y.
Times, June 1, 2012, at A1 (reporting on classified program, based in part on internal administration
sources); Austin Wright, John McCain Demands Leak Investigation, Politico (June 5, 2012, 7:32 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0612/77089.html
(legislators
criticizing
the
Obama
administration’s self-leaking). For a further discussion on the disjunction between the Obama
administration’s practice of both leaking and decrying leaks, see Jack Goldsmith, President Obama’s
Non-Credible Statement on Leaks, Lawfare (June 8, 2012, 4:18 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/
2012/06/president-obamas-non-credible-statement-on-leaks. Notably, the George W. Bush
administration engaged in the same seemingly contradictory practice. See Robert Pear, Politics Can
Get in the Way of Keeping Papers Secret, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 2004, at A9 (detailing incidents when
the Bush administration allowed “political imperatives [to] force officials to set aside the government’s
normal procedures for classifying and declassifying national security information”). Members of
Congress, especially those opposed to the President, regularly complain of such leaks. See, e.g., Steven
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The New York Times’ 2005 disclosure of the National Security Agency’s
(the “NSA”) warrantless surveillance of domestic communication appears
to support both contradictory claims—that the government both retains
and loses too many secrets: the George W. Bush administration engaged in
extraordinary, seemingly successful efforts to maintain the program’s
secrecy—efforts that ultimately failed when the program’s outlines leaked
10
to the press.
Some commentators have resolved the conflict between these two
competing claims by hypothesizing that excessive secrecy causes
inadvertent leaks—that the government loses classified information
11
precisely because it classifies too much. Marginal increases in secrecy
are nothing new, however. Indeed, the complaint that the state hoards
12
too much information has a long history in the United States and in
13
critiques of bureaucratic secrecy. The United States has also regularly

Aftergood, McCain Calls for Special Counsel to Investigate Leaks, Secrecy News (June 6, 2012),
http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2012/06/mccain_leaks.html.
10. The program remained secret to the public for three years, from its inception in 2002 until its
disclosure in the New York Times in 2005, a year after the newspaper had first learned of it. See Eric
Lichtblau, Bush’s Law 194–99 (2008); James Risen, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA
and the Bush Administration 44–60 (2006); Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 77, 145–47 (2010); see also Alasdair Roberts, Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in the
Information Age 72–78, 232–33 (2006) (describing the unraveling of the Bush administration’s efforts to
control information about the invasion of Iraq and of detainee abuses in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay).
11. See, e.g., Bellia, supra note 7, at 1518–19 (listing over-classification, along with digital
technology and the quantity of classified documents and individuals with access to it, as “interrelated
factors [that] shape the environment for leaks”); Fuchs, supra note 1, at 139 (arguing that overclassification and excessive secrecy “undermine the effort to keep truly sensitive information secret”);
Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 881, 889 (“[T]he
potential for leaks grows with the number of official secrets and official secret-keepers.”). This
complaint is also time-honored. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (“[W]hen everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system
becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipulated by those intent on
self-protection or self-promotion.”).
12. The fact that unauthorized leaks constitute a grievous problem has been as widely
acknowledged, as has the fact that the government over-classifies the information it wants to control.
For a list of the ten government reports issued between 1956 and 2004 that have addressed and
condemned the problem of secrecy and government leaks, see Gary Ross, Who Watches the
Watchmen? The Conflict Between National Security and Freedom of the Press 17–20 (2011).
13. For at least the past century, scholars have understood that secrecy in organizations, including
government entities, is an inevitable product of the bureaucratic attempt to control information flows.
See, e.g., Sissela Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation 5–6 (1983) (defining
secrecy as the intentional concealment of information); Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel
345 (Kurt H. Wolff ed. & trans., 1950) (noting how organizations that control secret information use
secrecy to “determine[] the reciprocal relations among those who share it in common”); Max Weber,
Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology 992 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich
eds., 1968) (“Bureaucratic administration always tends to exclude the public, to hide its knowledge and
action from criticism as well as it can.”); Richard W. Wilsnack, Information Control: A Conceptual
Framework for Sociological Analysis, 8 Urb. Life 467 (1980) (attempting to develop a conceptual field for
the study of how organizations maintain control over access to information).
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lost information since its founding. A less secret government might lose
proportionally fewer secrets, but it could not stop all secrets from
escaping its control. To be sure, the state can protect some information,
15
especially “deep secrets”—the “unknown unknowns” which the public
does not know exist because they circulate within strict limits and benefit
16
from exceptional technological and logistical efforts to confine them.
Notwithstanding the state’s enormous precautions, many of its deepest
secrets ultimately come to light anyway. As with the NSA’s surveillance
17
program, the effort to keep deep secrets can delay disclosure, but it
18
often cannot prevent it entirely.
These secrecy failures occur because of the state’s bureaucratic
structure and the difficulties of both storing and communicating
information. The state must depend for its internal decisionmaking
process on the flow of information from sources dispersed within and
19
outside government. Like all large organizations engaged in complex
tasks, the administrative state neither circulates nor processes information
20
internally in a mechanical, coordinated, fully rational way. There is no
reason to think, therefore, that an organization which cannot perfectly
control or manage its internal flow of information can stop information
21
at the borders of its bureaucracy. Put simply, the effort to control state
information requires human, organizational, technological, and textual
mechanisms that often fail in the checks and balances of a democratic
state, sometimes by design and sometimes by the weakness of
bureaucratic control. Secrecy of any sort and to any degree is costly and

14. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 12, at 9–11; Richard B. Kielbowicz, The Role of News Leaks in
Governance and the Law of Journalists’ Confidentiality, 1795–2005, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 425, 432–41 (2006).
15. This phrase is commonly associated with former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who
used it to refer to information about Iraq’s effort to develop weapons of mass destruction. Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., DoD News Briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers, (Feb. 12,
2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636.
16. See generally David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 257 (2010).
17. See supra note 10.
18. Pozen, supra note 16, at 327–31 (discussing “deep secrets” that later came to light).
19. See Cass Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities,
126 Harv. L. Rev. 1838, 1839. 1842–43 (2013) (noting the crucial role that the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (the “OIRA”) plays for the President and White House by acquiring
information and knowledge that are dispersed within and outside of the administrative state).
20. Authoritative descriptions of this organizational phenomenon appear in James G. March,
Decisions and Organizations 385–403, 410–25 (1988), Harold Seidman & Robert Gilmour,
Politics, Position, and Power 219 (4th ed. 1986), and Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of
Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. Econ. 99 (1955). For an insightful explanation of the relationship between
information and foreign policy development that explains the imperfect means by which
administrations and presidents manage the internal flow of information, see Morton H. Halperin et
al., Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy 139–80 (2d ed. 2006).
21. See Halperin et al., supra note 20, at 181–203 (describing the means by which information
flows out of the state, and the various motivations of those who allow it to do so).
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difficult to accomplish and can only stem the authorized flow of official
22
information.
This is not, however, how the vast majority of reformers, activists,
and academics understand the issue. Transparency proponents view
secrecy as an inefficient and harmful bureaucratic practice whose
23
overregulation of information flows demands correction. It is a
correctable bug in the system, one that the right mix of legal and
institutional reforms can fix by allowing information to flow to the
24
public. Secrecy’s proponents view the issue from an opposite, though
parallel, position. Their concern for national security, foreign relations,
and law enforcement—and for allowing an autonomous, unitary
executive to protect the flow of information—leads them to view secrecy
25
as a crucial administrative goal. Like transparency proponents, secrecy
proponents frame their dissatisfaction as a solvable legal problem: if we
design laws and institutions to protect the executive’s privilege to control
information, then we can re-establish a correct balance between
26
transparency and secrecy. The bug in governance that secrecy advocates
trust law to correct is excessive disclosure, not the excessive protection of
information.
But perfect information control of whatever sort is in fact an
27
implausible goal. The laws and legal norms that ensure limited,

22. This Article considers only government secrecy in the United States and makes no claims
about the portability of its conclusions to other nations and especially to other political systems. It
should be noted, however, that information still flows even in autocratic and secretive regimes: it just
does so more, and often much more, through rumors, gossip, and figurative forms (like the arts) than
through a private press or formal civil society institutions. This was particularly the case in the Soviet
Union, for example. See Geoffrey Hosking, Rulers And Victims: The Russians in the Soviet
Union 51 (2006); Raymond A. Bauer & David B. Gleicher, Word-of-Mouth Communication in the
Soviet Union, 17 Pub. Opinion Q. 297, 298–300 (1953); Thomas Remington, The Mass Media and
Public Communication in the USSR, 43 J. Pol. 803, 803–05 (1981).
23. See, e.g., Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Secrecy: The American Experience 59 (1998)
(characterizing secrecy as a correctable form of regulation).
24. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 Wash. U. L. Q. 1,
15–17 (1976) (arguing for “right to know” with broad standing component for public to seek judicial
enforcement); Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial
Intervention, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 909 (2006) (arguing for the development of “platforms” of
constitutional concepts enabling more rigorous judicial review of information access issues). See
generally Mark Fenster, The Transparency Fix: Advocating Legal Rights and Their Alternatives in the
Pursuit of a Visible State, 73 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 443 (2012) (chronicling the history of open government
advocacy and its focus on legal solutions to government secrecy).
25. See Gabriel Schoenfeld, Necessary Secrets: National Security, the Media, and the Rule
of Law (2010); Nathan Alexander Sales, Secrecy and National Security Investigations, 58 Ala. L.
Rev. 811, 818–21 (2007).
26. A preeminent proponent of this position is former Vice President Dick Cheney. See infra
Part IV.B.
27. To be clear, this is not an argument that “information wants to be free.” See generally John
Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Patents and Copyrights in the Digital Age,
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imperfect secrecy and transparency do not lend themselves easily to legal
reform; rather than bugs in the system of governance, they are part of its
operating code. Like the open government laws that cannot always force
28
the flow of information from a sprawling, stubborn bureaucracy, laws
that authorize the government to keep secrets cannot construct a perfect
informational dam against the leaks caused by that same bureaucracy.
Information can flow as a result of formal legal requirements; it can leak
out from sources within government; it can be found in open sources
besides the state; and it can become visible due to official mistake.
Furthermore, secrecy engenders public speculation about what is being
withheld, while the process of keeping secrets, once made public, itself
communicates important information about the state and its governance
strategy. Under-enforced and often unenforceable laws and regulations,
bureaucratic inertia and resistance, and the push and pull of an advanced
democracy with vibrant civil institutions render both transparency and
secrecy implausible.
This Article critiques some of the foundational assumptions of
constitutional and statutory laws that seek to regulate information flows,
while complicating and countering the extensive literature on secrecy
and leaks that rest on those assumptions. Unlike most articles in this
area, my concerns are not normative: this Article will not argue in favor
of transparency or against secrecy, principles that are typically espoused
in persuasive rhetoric that finds deep secrecy morally repugnant to a
29
democratic state. Nor will it argue that efforts to control information
are benign or have no ill effect. They can, for example, delay disclosure
even when they cannot prevent it permanently. Instead, this Article
focuses on why the control of government information that secrecy
proponents and critics assume is possible cannot in fact be achieved on a
regular and programmatic basis. Outlining the limits to information
control and discussing several instances of notable control failures in
detail, this Article contends that secrecy is in fact implausible.
My purpose is to better understand what information control can
and cannot accomplish, and what effects it actually has—and, as a
consequence, both the powers and limits of the executive’s ability to
govern in a unitary and coordinated fashion. The issue requires a broad

Wired, Mar. 1994 (establishing that phrase, and its libertarian implications, in the technophilic
lexicon). Information neither wants to be free nor wants to be controlled. It is a thing; it cannot want.
Rather, information circulates in a social environment that makes it difficult to control.
28. Cf. Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 885, 914–15 (2006)
[hereinafter Fenster, Opacity] (critiquing assumptions embedded in the concept of “transparency”).
29. This is particularly true in the field of constitutional law. For recent arguments against deep
secrecy’s constitutionality, see Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege
Revisited, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 489, 522–27 (2006); Pozen, supra note 16, at 305–23.
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consideration of the legal, administrative, and social means by which the
state both controls and loses control of information, as well as the ethical
and political checks on that control. To that end, Part I of this Article
identifies the laws and bureaucratic norms that allow and encourage
secrecy, and notes the important but incomplete formal legal limits on
secrecy. Part II outlines the various informal impediments—
bureaucratic, political, and technological—to the state’s ability to control
information.
Understanding this phenomenon also requires a grasp of the very
different ways that the state can lose control of information. Through
30
case studies, Parts III through V present illustrative secrecy failures in
instances when the state has tried it’s hardest to keep secrets. Part III
chronicles the effort by the George W. Bush administration to keep secret
Vice President Dick Cheney’s National Energy Policy Development
Group (“NEPDG”), a key pre-9/11 episode that foreshadowed later
struggles over executive branch secrecy. Its significance is more than as a
mere prelude to the broader efforts to control information that followed.
The Vice President’s efforts to keep NEPDG’s actions secret relied upon
the most well-articulated theory of executive control over information,
which Cheney had helped develop in writings that he had overseen and
published. Notwithstanding this explicit attempt to deploy the theory of
perfect information control in practice, the myriad legal and extralegal
ways by which NEPDG information escaped the Vice President’s control
illustrate secrecy’s limits and implausibility. Part IV describes the
attempted redaction of classified information as a general type of secrecy
failure that has occurred in several recent instances. Part V discusses the
difficulty that the government faces in controlling even its most prized
secrets about covert operations, focusing on one of the most significant
such operations in twentieth century United States history: the CIA-led
coup in Guatemala in 1954, which deposed that country’s popularly
elected president.
The Conclusion draws three implications from secrecy’s
implausibility: first, that law has limited effects on secrecy’s possible
success, leaving politics and ethics as levers that play crucial roles in
limiting and imposing secrecy; second, that we would be better served to

30. This Article’s argument asserts that legal and bureaucratic systems of control fail and that
information can and will escape in a myriad of ways—even in those cases in which the government
tries hardest to protect its secrets. To prove and illustrate this argument, the case study method’s
sensitivity to historical specificity and contingency outweighs its limitations in scale and the danger
that each case is anomalous. This Article’s three different sets of case studies—which concern varied
methods by which the state has sought to control information about domestic policy development,
intelligence operations, and covert action—demonstrate the argument’s application across a variety of
state actions.
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re-conceptualize the availability of information in terms other than as a
binary between secrecy and disclosure; and third, because secrecy proves
increasingly implausible in the long run, reform efforts should focus on
express pre-commitments to the timely, if delayed, systematic release of
the executive branch’s most prized information.

I. Secrecy’s Laws and Norms
The contemporary state keeps secrets—an enormous quantity of
them, in fact. In the United States, government over-classification of
information is excessive secrecy’s most obvious and outrageous
manifestation. As a regulatory regime developed to protect Cold War
secrets, information classification has mushroomed to a multi-billion
dollar regulatory program—$11.36 billion in fiscal year 2011, a figure that
has steadily risen since 1995 and that does not include the enormous
costs borne by the major intelligence agencies, whose budgets are
31
themselves classified. Thousands of officials with delegated authority
classify and then seek to protect documents as secret; hundreds of
thousands of documents are classified annually; tens of millions of
government documents incorporate classified information and in the
process become part of a universe characterized as “derivative
32
classification.” The state’s ability to control information to this extent
depends not only upon the formal legal doctrines that allow the executive
branch to protect secrets, but also the informal institutional norms that
impose professional and social obligations on executive branch officers to
respect and uphold an agency’s secrecy regime.
A. Secrecy Law
Both explicitly and implicitly, law enables—and even encourages—
executive branch secrecy. The Constitution’s construction of separate
powers provides the most significant, as well as the most abstract, source
of legal authority for the executive’s protection of information. The
Supreme Court has found that Article II confers on the President the
power to classify and control information regarding national security and
33
foreign policy, especially where Congress has not provided otherwise.
Congress can only limit presidential control over executive branch
information if it does not prevent the President from accomplishing his

31. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., Info. Sec. Oversight Office, 2011 Cost Report 2–3 (2012).
32. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., Info. Sec. Oversight Office, 2011 Report to the
President 1–9 (2012).
33. Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527, 530 (1988); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291
(1981).
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34

“constitutionally assigned functions.” Congress can, for example, require
executive branch agencies to respond to private individuals’ informational
requests and can delegate to the federal courts the authority to resolve
disputes between agencies and requesters, but only so long as the
documents demanded do not impinge on the President’s privilege to
35
withhold certain types of information.
This protection from interbranch intrusion provides the President
and executive branch with the privilege to hold certain secrets from
36
Congress and against Congress’s wishes. The privilege’s abstract and
highly contested contours appear in a cluster of related doctrines, some
of which fall within the formal doctrine of “executive privilege.” The
D.C. Circuit has distinguished three separate privileges that compose the
doctrine: (1) a classic but somewhat narrow, absolute privilege to
withhold information “crucial to fulfillment of the unique role and
responsibilities of the executive branch of our government;” (2) a
broader privilege to withhold “presidential communications” among the
President and his closest advisors, which is subject to a deferential
judicial balancing test; and (3) a qualified “deliberative process privilege”
protecting information from the process of government decision37
making. The concept of privilege extends to include the “state secrets”
doctrine, which allows the Department of Justice to bar plaintiffs from
access to national security information in tort litigation filed against the
38
military or other government agencies. And the executive branch can
broadly protect its deliberative process by designing or using groups to
seek advice in performing its constitutional duties without disclosing
information produced by and for them, notwithstanding legislation that
39
seeks to impose openness mandates on advisory committees. Viewed
broadly, “privilege” serves as a legal concept that refers to the executive’s
authority to control information; viewed in its strongest form, as the

34. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (upholding the Presidential
Recordings and Materials Preservation Act against constitutional challenge for violating the
separation of powers).
35. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 83 (1973).
36. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705–06 (1974) (recognizing the executive’s
“supremacy . . . within its own assigned area of constitutional duties”).
37. In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 736–40 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
38. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6–10 (1953) (establishing the state-secrets doctrine).
See generally Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1249, 1270–1308 (2007) (surveying executive branch’s use of doctrine).
39. Public Citizen v. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 442, 466–67 (1989) (interpreting the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (the “FACA”) narrowly to avoid the “formidable constitutional difficulties”
that would arise if it were applied to the President’s use of the American Bar Association’s Standing
Committee to receive advice on Supreme Court nominations). See generally infra Part III.B
(summarizing and analyzing underlying separation of powers issues in dispute over FACA’s
application).
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George W. Bush administration advocated more forcefully than its recent
40
predecessors, the Constitution’s textual commitment of the “Executive
Power,” among other authorities, grants the President a “zone of
41
autonomy” from congressional intrusion.
Beyond specific doctrines, the privilege concept affects the
institutional relationship between the executive and judiciary. Courts defer
to executive branch claims or avoid potential constitutional conflicts with
42
the executive branch by construing statutes narrowly. In Nixon v. United
States (which rejected the President’s effort to use the deliberative
privilege to withhold White House tapes from the special prosecutor
investigating Watergate), the Supreme Court used sweeping language to
recognize the President’s authority to shield privileged information in
43
certain circumstances. Nixon can thus be read in two ways, both of
which enable secrecy as a matter of law or practice. Nixon represents
either, as William Van Alstyne characterized it, “an oblique invitation to
the President to throttle judicial review by presenting a claim of
44
executive privilege in the cellophane wrapper of ‘national security,’” or
it more expressly invites endless political struggles over information
45
between the executive and legislature. Political struggle, which has
proven the most frequent means to resolve executive privilege disputes
46
over information, will favor the political branch that holds the
information, giving a great advantage to the executive. If the executive
privilege claim is colorable, and if courts slowly and only occasionally
resolve disputed instances of its use, a presidential administration can use

40. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A
Constitutional History, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, 1094–97 (2008). But see Mark J. Rozell, The Clinton
Legacy: An Old (or New) Understanding of Executive Privilege?, in The Presidency and the Law:
The Clinton Legacy 58, 70 (David Gray Adler & Michael A. Genovese eds., 2002) (arguing that
President Clinton’s misuse of executive privilege gave the doctrine a “bad name”).
41. Brief for Petitioners at 34, Cheney v. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004) (No. 03-475) (citing
U.S. Const. art. II, §§ 1, 2, cl. 1, 3, cl. 1); see also Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The
Unitary Executive 407 (2008) (identifying the government’s argument in its brief in Cheney as a key
example of how the Bush administration “staunchly protected the autonomy of the executive branch
in the courts”). This Article discusses the Court’s decision in this case, and the circumstances
surrounding the litigation, in Part III, infra.
42. Kitrosser, supra note 29, at 501–02.
43. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705–07 (1974) (holding that deliberative privilege loses
in a balance against the need for information in a criminal prosecution, while recognizing a broad
privilege “to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets”).
44. William Van Alstyne, A Political and Constitutional Review of United States v. Nixon,
22 UCLA L. Rev. 116, 123 (1974).
45. Louis Fisher, Congressional Access to National Security Information, 45 Harv. J. on Legis.
219, 219–20 (2008); Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege Revived?: Secrecy and Conflict During the Bush
Presidency, 52 Duke L.J. 403, 404 (2002).
46. Joel D. Bush, Congressional-Executive Access Disputes: Legal Standards and Political
Settlements, 9 J.L. & Pol. 719, 735 (1993).
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the doctrine to keep secrets, at least temporarily. Between the President’s
occasional successes in the courts, the costs required to challenge exercises
of executive authority, and the delays caused by a President’s resistance to
disclosure, executive privilege grants the President the practical and legal
47
ability to control information.
Non-constitutional authorities parallel and extend the constitutional
privilege. In its open government legislation, Congress typically respects
48
the President’s authority by protecting certain kinds of documents and
49
50
certain types of government entities and advisors from disclosure
mandates. The classification system, largely developed and overseen by
the executive branch itself, enables agencies with classification authority
to keep information secret almost indefinitely and without interbranch
51
oversight. The Freedom of Information Act (the “FOIA”) explicitly
52
excludes classified documents from disclosure, while the Espionage Act
criminalizes the knowing and intentional unauthorized disclosure of
53
classified information. The Whistleblower Protection Act specifically
54
excludes from its protection personnel in the intelligence community,
more generally excludes civil servant positions of a “confidential, policy55
determining, policy-making, or policy-advocating character,” and grants
the President authority to exempt any positions when the President finds
56
it “necessary and warranted by conditions of good administration.” It
explicitly precludes from protection disclosures of information
“specifically prohibited by law and if such information is not specifically
required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national
57
defense or the conduct of foreign affairs.” The Intelligence Community

47. Louis Fisher, The Politics of Executive Privilege 257–59 (2004).
48. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9) (2006) (exempting certain documents from disclosure under the
Freedom of Information Act (the “FOIA”)).
49. Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980) (holding
that FOIA does not apply to close presidential advisors); 50 U.S.C. § 3507 (2013) (exempting the
Central Intelligence Agency (the “CIA”) from any law requiring “disclosure of the organization,
functions, names official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency”).
50. Public Citizen v. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 462–65 (1989) (interpreting FACA narrowly
to restrain its reach from purely private groups “not formed at the behest of the Executive or by quasipublic organizations whose opinions the Federal Government sometimes solicits”).
51. Executive Order No. 13,526, 3 C.F.R. 298, § 1.2(a)(1)–(3) (2009) (authorizing the
classification system by means of Obama administration’s executive order). In dicta, the Supreme
Court has found classification authority in the Constitution’s Commander in Chief Clause. Dep’t of
the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527–28 (1988).
52. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).
53. See 18 U.S.C. § 793(d)–(e) (2006); see also infra notes 160–162 and accompanying text.
54. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii).
55. Id. § 2302(a)(2)(B)(i).
56. Id. § 2303(a)(2)(B)(ii).
57. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Espionage Act and National Security Whistleblowing After
Garcetti, 57 Am. U. L. Rev. 1531, 1537 (2008); see also 5 U.S.C. § 1213(a)(1)(B).
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Whistleblower Protection Act (the “ICWPA”) covers intelligence
community employees and identifies appropriate mechanisms for
reporting items of concern (fraud, waste, abuse, illegal activity) in an
appropriate manner, but notably does not include disclosures to the
58
media. Congress has thereby created or permitted the creation of laws
and executive branch authorities that sanction the regular production
and protection of secrets.
B. Secrecy Norms
No presidential administration welcomes unauthorized leaks, and
59
most—including the alleged “hermetic seal” of the administration of
George W. Bush—attempt to threaten those officials who leak without
authorization with criminal punishment. But threats of criminal sanction
are only one means of stopping leaks. Bureaucratic structures and
practices also establish norms of official behavior that create and protect
secrets. Organizational control of information works to define the
organization’s boundaries: those inside enjoy access to the shared,
exclusive knowledge that members possess; those outside are excluded
60
from the organization’s secrets. Secrecy thereby produces a paradox; it
commands an organization’s members both to practice control and
silence around outsiders and demands that they share, discuss, and
61
obsess over information among those within the organization. A secrecy
regime thus requires collective self-discipline built from a strong sense of
62
privileged exclusion. Formal legal protections for the maintenance of
secrecy must rely heavily on such informal organizational means that
government entities use both to protect and to communicate secrets.
These informal means can prove quite powerful. Daniel Ellsberg,
who leaked the Pentagon Papers to the press, characterizes such norms
as the “psychosocial aspects” of organizational membership. By building
self- and professional identity around membership, an organization that
holds secrets threatens to exclude those who break their promise not to
63
share information with outsiders. Informing outside authorities about
an organization’s secrets thus breaches an individual member’s loyalty to

58. The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 701, 112 Stat.
2396 (1998) (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 8H) (containing the ICWPA); id. § 702 (containing an
identical provision applicable to the CIA and codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403q(d)(5) (2013)).
59. Peter Baker, What’s Leaking Out of the White House?, Wash. Post (Apr. 8, 2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/06/AR2007040601818.html.
60. Simmel, supra note 13, at 332; Gary Alan Fine & Lori Holyfield, Secrecy, Trust, and Dangerous
Leisure: Generating Group Cohesion in Voluntary Organizations, 59 Soc. Psychol. Q. 22, 29–30 (1996).
61. Beryl L. Bellman, The Paradox of Secrecy, 4 Hum. Stud. 1, 8–9, 21 (1981).
62. T. M. Luhrmann, The Magic of Secrecy, 17 Ethos 131, 161–62 (1989).
63. Daniel Ellsberg, Secrecy and National Security Whistleblowing, 77 Soc. Res. 773, 777 (2010).
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the organization and to the organization’s hierarchical authority. As a
result of their actions, those who tell an organization’s secrets face
significant costs to their career, including retaliatory suspension or
termination from their jobs and the loss of informational privileges like
65
security access that might be required for their profession. Whistleblowers
and leakers can irrevocably shatter their professional and personal lives
through their actions, facing exile from the community to which they had
66
belonged, as well as their access to an exciting, exclusive world that
67
enlivened the professional, bureaucratic mundanity of their work lives.
Organizational and professional membership pulls individuals into the
world of secret information and binds them there, in the process shoring
up the formal legal secrecy system by discouraging members from leaking
information, and at times by encouraging them to destroy or keep hidden
68
information from investigators.
C. Secrecy’s Legal and Institutional Limits
Of course, legal and structural restraints on secrecy do exist, even in
the face of executive branch resistance. Courts do not always shy away
from constitutional clashes over information and do not always view the
69
zone of constitutional privilege expansively. In the federal system,
Congress has the authority and legal tools to oversee agencies, investigate
the White House, and leverage its ability to punish agencies and
70
individuals to lift the veil on executive branch secrecy. It does so through
its oversight authority, committee structure, subpoena and impeachment

64. Bok, supra note 13, at 214–16.
65. Amanda C. Leiter, “Whistle . . . and You’ve Got an Audience”, 36 Fordham Urb. L.J. 747,
757–58 (2008); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National
Security Information, 83 Ind. L.J. 233, 248 (2008); Scott Shane, There Are Leaks. And Then There Are
Leaks, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 2006, at A4 (providing examples of officials who have lost their jobs as a
result of their leaking information).
66. C. Fred Alford, Whistleblowers: Broken Lives and Organizational Power 119–21
(2001); Myron Peretz Glazer & Penina Migdal Glazer, The Whistleblowers: Exposing
Corruption in Government and Industry 133–66 (1989).
67. Luhrmann, supra note 62, at 141.
68. See, e.g., David A. Wallace, Implausible Deniability: The Politics of Documents in the IranContra Affair and Its Investigations, in Archives and the Public Good 91, 111–12 (Richard J. Cox &
David A. Wallace eds., 2002) (describing how those involved in the Iran-Contra scandal blocked
investigators from key documents).
69. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708–13 (1974) (considering presidential privilege “in
light of our historic commitment to the rule of law,” and holding that the President’s privilege claim
did not outweigh the interest in “the fair administration of criminal justice”).
70. Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 61, 104–05 (2006);
Mathew P. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L.
Econ. & Org. 243, 259–60 (1987).
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powers, appropriation authority, and by using its legislative power to
create public rights in executive branch information and to protect
73
whistleblowers from retaliation. Courts, too, limit secrecy in a number
of ways beyond high-profile constitutional disputes. They enforce
74
statutory disclosure mandates, and they oversee the discovery process in
75
criminal prosecution and in private tort suits against the government.
These formal limits on executive branch secrecy are famously
imperfect. Congressional oversight, especially of national security matters,
is fragmented among numerous committees that are variable in strength
76
and focus, and it is frequently quite deferential. The institutional
interbranch rivalry that should theoretically lead the legislature to probe
executive branch performance is often overwhelmed by an interparty
rivalry that colors oversight by producing either overly deferential or
politically antagonistic (rather than objectively probing and curious)
77
congressional committees. Moreover, Congress may enjoy even less
public credibility than the executive branch, limiting their leverage
against the President as well as the efficacy of their oversight. The open
government laws that Congress has enacted include exceptions that
78
sometimes swallow the statutory mandates whole. Presidential
administrations and the bureaucracies they oversee have failed to
79
perfectly comply with the demands that statutes place on them. At the
same time, courts have often proven less than fully fearless in their
willingness to enforce legal mandates against resistant government
entities, deferring to formal executive privilege claims and more general

71. Frederick M. Kaiser et al., Cong. Research Serv., Congressional Oversight Manual 22–
32 (2011); Mathew P. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 165, 165–66 (1984).
72. U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2; Beermann, supra note 70, at 84–90.
73. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006) (FOIA); id. § 552b (Government in the Sunshine Act);
44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–07 (2006) (Presidential Records Act); Whistleblower Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1994) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
74. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (granting federal district courts jurisdiction under the FOIA to order
production of documents “improperly withheld”).
75. See generally Edward A. Tomlinson, Use of the Freedom of Information Act for Discovery
Purposes, 43 Md. L. Rev. 119, 136–49 (1984) (describing federal rules of civil and criminal procedure
as they apply to the government and their interplay with the FOIA).
76. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian
Republic 25–26 (2010); Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring
and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1655, 1660–73 (2006).
77. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 Harv. L. Rev.
2311, 2344–47 (2006).
78. See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.
79. David C. Vladeck, Information Access—Surveying the Current Legal Landscape of Federal
Right-to-Know Laws, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 1787, 1790 (2008).
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arguments about the dangers of disclosure to national security.
Similarly, as critics regularly complain, whistleblower laws provide
insufficient protection to employees who want to disclose information
81
about government malfeasance.
Nevertheless, the assemblage of transparency laws provides a
substantive, if imperfect, limitation on government secrecy. Most
significantly, it establishes administrative norms from which secrecy is
viewed as a departure, and it constructs a legal and ideological beachhead
against which transparency advocates and political minorities and other
82
groups seeking to pry information from the state can wage battle. This
formal assemblage resembles a patchwork, one whose fabrics have
variable weight and strength and cover significant practices and
government entities, but that may be too frail and have too many bare
patches to afford complete and comprehensive coverage.

II. Institutional and Informal Constraints on Secrecy
The bare patches in the formal legal checks on secrecy appear to
allow the executive branch to control significant quantities of information.
The enormous public funds spent on classification reveal just how much
the state thinks it can control information and how much it is willing to pay
83
to try. But informal constraints on the state’s ability to keep secrets
raise the costs of information control and lower the state’s ability to hold
84
secrets. This Part briefly identifies and describes four such constraints:
(1) the information flows that leaks create from all parts of the state,
sometimes as part of an authorized program to achieve institutional
political ends, and sometimes by an individual or group acting without
authorization that hopes to subvert state policies and harm the current
political regime or individual state actors; (2) bureaucratic errors that
lead to information becoming public without authorization; (3) open
sources that make available putatively “secret” information that the state
attempts to protect; and (4) the messages that the state sends in its very

80. Jane E. Kirtley, Transparency and Accountability in a Time of Terror: The Bush
Administration’s Assault on Freedom of Information, 11 Comm. L. & Pol’y 479, 486, 490–91 (2006);
Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 Sup. Ct. Rev. 47, 61–63.
81. Terance Miethe, Whistleblowing at Work: Tough Choices in Exposing Fraud, Waste,
and Abuse on the Job 147–48 (1999). See generally Bruce D. Fisher, The Whistleblower Protection Act
of 1989: A False Hope for Whistleblowers, 43 Rutgers L. Rev. 355 (1991).
82. Cf. Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 U.
Pa. J. Const. L. 1011, 1079 (2008) (noting the imperfections but importance and value of FOIA).
83. See discussion supra notes 31–32.
84. The use of the term “informal” here and elsewhere attempts to distinguish those practices
that occur outside of or as an accident of the authority of formal government institutions. This is,
admittedly, a rough distinction, and one that does not fit perfectly in every instance, but is intended as
a helpful heuristic rather than a technical distinction.
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practice of keeping secrets. This Part introduces the broad range of
informal means by which information moves from the state, means that
the remainder of the Article illustrates in detailed case studies.
A. Leaks as Deliberate Informational Flows
Unauthorized disclosure is the most well-known and widely discussed
means by which information flows outside the state informally without
85
either government sanction or legal obligation. “Unauthorized” in this
context can mean quite different things depending on the leaker’s
identity and purpose—a problem that efforts to legislate against leaks
86
must confront. High-ranking officials frequently provide information
“off-the-record” or “not for attribution” to a reporter as part of a
coordinated plan to communicate with, cajole, or pressure outsiders—
including other agencies and branches of government, political parties,
87
private interests, and the general public. Such leaks are pervasive in
Washington, ubiquitous elements in a competitive democratic system
88
served by competitive private news organizations. They are only
“unauthorized” insofar as they provide information in an informal
89
manner outside of official channels and formal disclosure processes.
85. Recent works on leaks include Jack Goldsmith, Power and Constraint: The Accountable
Presidency 51–82 (2012); William E. Lee, Deep Background: Journalists, Sources, and the Perils of
Leaking, 57 Am. U. L. Rev. 1453, 1467–70 (2008); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and
Scapegoats: The Press and National Security Information, 83 Ind. L.J. 233 (2008); David E. Pozen, The
Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns, and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of
Information, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 512 (2013).
86. On the complexity of defining “unauthorized disclosure” and Congress’s recent efforts to
define it, see Steven Aftergood, What Is an Unauthorized Disclosure?, Secrecy News (Aug. 1, 2012),
http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2012/08/unauthorized_disclosure.html; Josh Gerstein & Scott Wong,
Bill to Plug Leaks Doesn’t Reach White House, Politico (July 31, 2012, 11:36 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0712/79237.html#ixzz22Jo2Qfcr; David Ignatius, Senate’s AntiLeaking Bill Doesn’t Address the Real Sources of Information, Wash. Post (July 31, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-senates-anti-leaking-bill-doesnt-address-thereal-sources-of-information/2012/07/31/gJQAPBElNX_story.html.
87. See Keith V. Erickson, Presidential Leaks: Rhetoric and Mediated Political Knowledge,
56 Comm. Monographs 199, 201 (1989); Adrienne M. Jamieson, The Messenger as Policy Maker:
Thinking About the Press and Policy Networks in the Washington Community, in Democracy and
North America 118–19 (Alan Ware ed., 1996); Leon V. Sigal, Official Secrecy and Informal
Communication in Congressional-Bureaucratic Relations, 90 Pol. Sci. Q. 71, 72–74 (1975).
88. Affidavit of Max Frankel ¶ 5, N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (71 Civ.
2662), 1971 WL 224067 (noting that extensive government secrecy is “unraveled by that same
Government, by Congress and by the press in one continuing round of professional and social contacts
and cooperative and competitive exchanges of information”). Frankel recently wrote that the
phenomenon continues to exist more than three decades later. Max Frankel, The Washington Back
Channel, N.Y. Times Mag., Mar. 25, 2007, at 40, 43.
89. The Obama administration, for example, coordinated access to information about the raid on
Osama bin Laden’s hiding place in Pakistan for a sympathetic filmmaker even as federal agencies
refused to disclose the same documents in response to FOIA requests. Glenn Greenwald, WH leaks
for Propaganda Film, Salon (May 23, 2012, 5:32 AM), http://www.salon.com/2012/05/23/
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High-ranking officials also leak frequently, usually passing information
(including some that is classified) to writers and reporters in order to
90
burnish or solidify their own reputations. These reciprocal relationships
between source and press allow officials to trade information in exchange
91
for publicity and status, among other things.
Unlike the high-level leakers or their agents who bear little or no risk
of reprisal or prosecution, informal leaks made outside of the bureaucratic
or political command chain—or, worse, in specific opposition to the state
92
Government
or administration—bear some risk of prosecution.
employees enjoy little legal protection from retaliation by their employers
when the employees’ actions are not subject to statutory whistleblower
93
protection. When their leaks contain classified information, they may face
prosecution under the Espionage Act—prohibiting unauthorized
94
disclosure of “information respecting the national defense” —and the
Intelligence Agencies Identity Protection Act—prohibiting disclosure of
95
“information identifying [a] covert agent.” The First Amendment offers
96
leakers only thin protection, if any at all, and the reporters to whom
they leak enjoy no First Amendment right to shield their sources’
identities—although they may have a common law federal right to do so,
97
as well as statutory rights in some states. The news organizations that
wh_leaks_for_propaganda_film; Andrea Stone, Obama Officials Gave Hollywood Filmmaker Access
to Team That Killed Bin Laden, Records Show, Huffington Post (May 23, 2012, 10:11 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/23/white-house-kathryn-bigelow-bin-laden_n_1538847.html.
90. See Goldsmith, supra note 85, at 70–71.
91. Itzhak Galnoor, Government Secrecy: Exchanges, Intermediaries, and Middlemen, 35 Pub.
Admin. Rev. 32, 40–41 (1975).
92. David Pozen persuasively argues that the institutional dynamics within the executive branch,
which create incentives not only for individuals to leak but excellent reasons for the Department of
Justice to under-enforce anti-leaking laws, lead to few formal criminal prosecutions of leakers and, as
best as he could learn, few formal administration sanctions. Pozen, supra note 85, at 594. Left unclear,
however, is the extent to which informal sanctions attach to mid- and low-level employees who leak
without authorization—especially if they leak in a way that harms the administration or the agency
that employs them.
93. On the limits of whistleblower statutes, see supra notes 54–57, 81 and accompanying text.
94. 18 U.S.C. § 793(a) (2012).
95. 50 U.S.C. § 421(a)–(b) (2011).
96. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006). Scholars vigorously disagree over this
proposition. Compare Vladeck, supra note 57, at 1537–42 (asserting that recent Supreme Court precedent
provides no First Amendment protection outside of statutory whistleblower protection), with Mary-Rose
Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of Off-Duty Government Employees, 2010 BYU L. Rev. 2117, 2119
(2010) (characterizing current doctrine as distinguishing between government employee speech when onduty, when First Amendment protections do not apply, and when off-duty, when they do), and Heidi
Kitrosser, Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State: Calibrating First Amendment Protections for
Leakers of Classified Information, 6 J. Nat’l Security L. & Pol’y 409, 421–26 (2013) (arguing in favor of
First Amendment protection based on “constitutional text, structure, and principle”).
97. It is unlikely that reporters enjoy a First Amendment right to protect the identity of their
leaks against criminal prosecution, and it is unclear if they enjoy a federal common law right to do so.
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 697 (1972) (finding no First Amendment right to protect
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publish leaks enjoy First Amendment protection against prior restraint,
although they may still face prosecution under the Espionage Act for
99
leaks of classified information. But notwithstanding the recent upticks
in leak prosecutions by the Obama administration (some of which are
being pursued as holdovers from the Bush administration), prosecutions
for illegal disclosures are difficult for the government to pursue and win.
The threat of prosecution and the cost of mounting a criminal defense
100
might nevertheless be sufficient to deter many from leaking.
And yet, unauthorized disclosures by mid-level government
personnel are common, despite the minimal protection from retaliation
and prosecution that law provides whistleblowers, and despite of the
normative punishments and constraints that further increase the risks and
101
costs that government employees face in leaking information. For
decades, internal government reports have regularly complained of the
102
prevalence of classified information leaks —the most embarrassing leaks
for the government, and the ones for which leakers face the greatest risks
of punishment and prosecution. Indeed, this phenomenon is as old as the
103
It occurs even in the most secretive and paranoid
nation itself.
administrations, such as that of Richard Nixon, which sprung numerous,
104
Truly
unauthorized leaks despite its illegal efforts to stop them.

identity of sources from a criminal investigation); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d
1141, 1145–49 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that Branzburg foreclosed a First Amendment right for
reporters to shield sources against a grand jury investigation); id. at 1149–50 (noting a split opinion
among three-judge panel on the question of common law privilege, but deciding that it would not
apply in this case). On shield laws generally, see Sandra Davidson & David Herrera, Needed: More
than a Paper Shield, 20 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1277 (2012). For a compendium of state shield laws,
see Rep. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, http://www.rcfp.org/privilege/shieldmap.html (last visited
Jan. 15, 2014).
98. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
99. See id. at 743–48 (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that the government can criminally
prosecute newspapers after publication); id. at 733, 737 (White, J., concurring) (stating he would have
“no difficulty” sustaining a conviction under the Espionage Act after publication).
100. See Scott Shane & Charlie Savage, Administration Took Accidental Path to Setting Record for
Leak Cases, N.Y. Times, June 20, 2012, at A14.
101. See Kielbowicz, supra note 14, at 478–80. Cf. Pozen, supra note 85, at 535–36 (arguing that the
minimal formal legal protections for leaking belies the Department of Justice’s practice of underenforcing criminal sanctions).
102. See, e.g., Deputy Inspector Gen. for Intelligence & Special Program Assessments, Report
on Sensitive Compartmented Information Leaks in the Department of Defense, Rep. No. 2012-056
(2012); Comm’n on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of
Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States 381–84 (2005).
103. See Kielbowicz, supra note 14, at 433.
104. See Stanley I. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon 108–25
(1990).
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successful bureaucratic secrecy requires powerful group identity and a
105
common cause—and even then, the protected secrets emerge over time.
Nevertheless, this is not a perfect system for defeating excessive
secrecy; indeed, it is not a system at all. The media to whom sources leak
information are unregulated and largely unaccountable, except by
106
professional norms of conduct and as market actors. The personal and
institutional competition that drives journalists and their editors toward
the “scoop” can render their reporting biased, partial, or even factually
107
incorrect. Insofar as leaks merely check a system of information
control, they do so randomly, and therefore lead to under- and overdisclosure depending upon individual officials’ willingness to risk leaking
and the government’s ability to stop them. Despite their non-systemic
and nonobjective qualities and their seeming randomness, leaks
commonly and regularly move information from the state, undercutting
efforts to control information and raising the costs and risks of secrecy.
B. Leaks as Accidental Informational Flows
Bureaucracies can also simply fail to hold information. Lax security,
for example, has resulted in unauthorized information disclosure by
allowing dissidents to access, remove, and copy secret material. This
occasionally results in the equivalent of leaks, though on a massive
scale—most famously, in the cases of Daniel Ellsberg and Chelsea (born
Bradley) Manning’s thefts of physical and digital documents, which
produced the massive Pentagon Papers and WikiLeaks disclosures
108
respectively. In each instance, the state had granted or enabled access
to information to officials, the officials grew disillusioned, and took
advantage of their access to copy classified documents, which their
superiors and the information security system failed to notice. Although
the leaks were intentional, they were the consequence of mistakes—
especially in Manning’s case. The bureaucratic apparatus had expanded

105. See, e.g., Christopher Grey, Decoding Organization: Bletchley Park, Codebreaking, and
Organization Studies 121–32 (2012) (describing the role of secrecy in Bletchley Park, Britain’s highly
successful World War II cryptographic unit, as well as its ultimate disclosure).
106. Jack Goldsmith, Secrecy and Safety, New Republic, Aug. 13, 2008, at 31, 34; Schoenfeld,
supra note 25, at 263–65.
107. See Elie Abel, Leaking: Who Does It? Who Benefits? At What Cost? at 68 (1987); Note,
Media Incentives and National Security Secrets, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 2228, 2236–44 (2009).
108. For further discussion on Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers, see generally Daniel Ellsberg,
Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers (2002); David Rudenstine, The Day the
Presses Stopped: A History of the Pentagon Papers Case 33–47 (1996). For further discussion on
Manning, see David Leigh & Luke Harding, WikiLeaks: Inside Julian Assange’s War on Secrecy
72–89 (2011); Greg Mitchell, The Age of WikiLeaks: From Collateral Murder to Cablegate
(and Beyond) 38–50 (2011).
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access to supposedly dreadful military secrets to individuals who in turn
109
betrayed those secrets quite willingly.
Mistakenly allowing malfeasance is just one bureaucratic failure;
sometimes officials inadvertently disclose information by simple mistake.
As Washington Post reporters Dana Priest and William Arkin have
documented, large quantities of classified and sensitive information are
available via simple Internet searches and peer-to-peer file sharing
software, often as a result of government employees’ insufficient security
110
measures. In one recent example, the NSA mistakenly posted an
unredacted version of a classified internal research article and then
111
hastily declassified it in order to cover up the agency’s error. In
another, a contractor hired by the Food and Drug Administration
mistakenly posted on a public website documents produced in a vast
surveillance program that the agency had undertaken to monitor the e112
As the number of
mail traffic of several dissident employees.
government employees and private contractors with security clearance
expands, the likelihood that more massive leaks of electronic documents
will occur also expands. In addition, in a reverse of the “mosaic theory”
under which the government argues that otherwise non-classified
information cannot be released under the FOIA because enemies can
113
use it to piece together classified information, government officials can
unknowingly provide small pieces of information that a reporter can
piece together to form an accurate accounting of secret government
114
action without an actual “leak.” The completed mosaic can in turn be
delivered to the public in disparate forms like spy novels—even those
115
published outside the United States.

109. See Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American
Security State 267 (2011) (noting the series of security errors that allowed Manning to take and leak
data).
110. Id. at 263–66.
111. Steven Aftergood, NSA Declassifies Secret Document After Publishing It, Secrecy News
(May 14, 2012), http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/2012/05/nsa_secret.
112. Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Vast FDA Effort Tracked E-mails of Its Scientists, N.Y. Times,
July 15, 2012, at A1, 15.
113. See generally Christina E. Wells, CIA v. Sims: Mosaic Theory and Government Attitude,
58 Admin. L. Rev. 845 (2006); David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the
Freedom of Information Act, 115 Yale L.J. 628 (2005).
114. See Martin Linsky, Impact: How the Press Affects Federal Policymaking 170–71, 192 (1986);
see, e.g., Fed. Reserve, Transcript of Meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee on October 30–
31, 2007, at 4, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20071031meeting.pdf
(transcribing the complaints of Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke about the disclosure of
confidential Federal Reserve policy as a result of a journalist’s having had many individual conversations with
official sources, each of whom gave him “a little of the story”).
115. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Tom Clancy’s Books Put Bits and Pieces Together, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30,
1987, at A5; Robert F. Worth, The Spy Novelist Who Knows Too Much, N.Y. Times Mag., Feb. 3,
2013, at 18 (regarding Gérard de Villiers).
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Mistaken and inadvertent disclosures are not systematic and many of
them are never spotted or exploited, but in the aggregate they undercut
government efforts to keep information secret. Whether kept in electronic
form and therefore vulnerable to easy transfer by mistake or theft, or
stored in someone’s memory and capable of being spoken, information is
akin to liquid—capable of flowing from the place it is stored in directions
116
and at a speed that make it impossible to fully control.
C. Information Flows Outside of the State’s Control
The universe of information that constitutes the “secrets” that the
state protects includes information that is available from non-state
sources. Indeed, the intelligence community has increasingly relied on,
117
and made public its reliance upon, what is called “open source
intelligence”—information gathered from widely available sources,
including mass media, government entities, and academic and
118
professional journals. The fact that it is “open,” however, does not
keep it from becoming “secret,” at least as a matter of law. The
government has argued, with some success in the courts, that the open
information it gathers can become secret when it is classified as a source,
on the theory that disclosure of the state’s use of that information for
national security purposes would allow the state’s enemies to learn its
119
sources and piece together its knowledge and methods. No matter how
one views the government’s claim that it can transform the open into the
secret merely by possessing it, the existence of open source intelligence
makes plain a salient fact: a great deal of valuable information exists and
flows outside of the state’s ambit, and many of the state’s secrets are
120
themselves based on public information.

116. Joel Brenner, America the Vulnerable: Inside the New Threat Matrix of Digital
Espionage, Crime, and Warfare 207–09 (2011).
117. Robert E. Barnsby So Long, and Thanks for All the Secrets: A Response to Professor Telman,
63 Ala. L. Rev. 667, 686–87 (2012); Danley K. Cornyn, Note, The Military, Freedom of Speech, and the
Internet: Preserving Operational Security and Servicemembers’ Right of Free Speech, 87 Tex. L. Rev.
463, 464 (2008).
118. Richard A. Best, Jr. & Alfred Cumming, Cong. Research Serv., No. RL34270, Open
Source Intelligence (OSINT): Issues for Congress 6 (2007). See Stephen C. Mercado, Sailing the
Sea of OSINT in the Information Age, 48 Stud. in Intelligence 45 (2004).
119. See supra note 114.
120. See Roberts, supra note 10, at 38–39. For example, environmental and geospatial information
that the federal government sought to remove from the Internet after the September 11 attacks was
nevertheless available from “industry and commercial businesses, academic institutions, Nongovernmental organizations, state and local governments, international suppliers, and even private
citizens who publish their own relevant materials on the Internet.” John C. Baker et al., Mapping the
Risks: Assessing the Homeland Security Implications of Publicly Available Geospatial
Information 124 (2004).
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Covert operations, for example, are the most secret of a state’s
actions, and the actions that the state most assiduously attempts to keep
secret. They will produce an enormous number of internal documents
sent by and to management and operations personnel that the state can
at least theoretically control. But the state cannot easily control official
121
information that it does not possess. A covert operation will have real
world effects that civilian witnesses and the local news media can observe
(which may provide the basis for reports and investigations by broader
media sources that receive international distribution), and that
government officials whose rule is being challenged and officials of other
122
states can discover. Journalists and then the public first learned about
the CIA’s post-9/11 “rendition” program, which flew suspected terrorists
to various locations on private jets, through foreign newspapers, private
websites run by aviation enthusiasts, and human rights advocates, all of
123
which rely on public sources of information and eyewitnesses. Any
informational sources outside of the state’s control that duplicate a
“secret” state document or make available its content, or that allow
124
outsiders to infer some secret, lessen the state’s ability to keep secrets.
D. Secrecy as Information
Finally, the very act of publicly keeping secrets—that is, of
controlling information in a manner that allows the public to know of the
secrecy process—cannot stop the flow of information about secrecy, as
well as speculation about what the secrets contain. To help understand
these phenomena, assume the existence of both known and unknown
125
secrets. The first category (“known unknowns”) includes information
that the government is known to possess; all that is secret is the precise
content of the information. For example, a publicly declared military
operation will have numerous operational secrets; the public knows that
such operations will exist and assumes the existence of secrets regarding
those operations. Indeed, controlling such secrecy is a long and widely
accepted prerogative of the President—it is as clear an application of the
126
privilege doctrine as exists. Nevertheless, the content of such secrets

121. See Galnoor, supra note 91, at 34–35.
122. See infra Part V.B (analyzing a covert operation where multiple sources of information were
available to contemporary observers and to historians after the fact).
123. Brenner, supra note 116, at 168–69.
124. See infra Part IV.B (providing case studies of redacted documents whose “secret” contents
were available through public sources).
125. See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text.
126. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (“No one would question but that [at time of
war] a government might prevent . . . the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number
and location of troops.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (quoting Near).
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can be the subject of speculation, as can the steps the military and
government take to control information about their operations. The
second category (“unknown unknowns”) includes unknown information
such as a successfully covert operation of which the public has not
become aware. The secrecy of such a program is complete and deep—the
public is not even aware of its own ignorance, and thus cannot speculate
127
about its context.
Now, assume that at some point after the covert operation’s
completion, the public learns of its existence, whether from official,
authorized disclosures or via leaks or open sources. This Article contends
that many, if not most, of such secrets migrate to the known-secrets
category over time by the means that this Part and the previous one
128
identified—legal disclosure mandates, leaks, mistakes, and open sources.
The once-covert operation is now known, and at least some of its secrets
have been disclosed. Other formerly unknown-unknown secrets have now
become known unknowns, or secrets about a known event, and some of
them can be inferred from disclosed information. Having learned of this
covert operation, the public has also become aware of the government’s
willingness to keep information secret and its ability to do so.
Two consequences flow from this. First, informed members of the
public—especially the press—will infer both from the fact of the past
covert operation and the fact that certain kinds of secrets were kept that
the government might have engaged in or might be developing similar
operations. Some investigative reporters and interested individuals will
try to uncover any such additional operations. Their efforts might prove
easier now that the first operation has become public. Some government
officials who are troubled either by another operation or by its secrecy
might be more willing to leak information to the press about the
additional operation(s), while reporters will now have a better sense not
only of what to look for but of where to look and whom to ask. Perhaps
the operation’s previous success at maintaining control over information
proves difficult to repeat, or the circle of individuals included in the
covert group widens, increasing the likelihood of leaks and mistakes. The
unknown unknowns will thereby become more difficult to keep secret.
Second, now that the broader, less-informed public knows that such
secret programs exist, some of them, and particularly those opposed to
the current government, will begin to speculate about additional secret

127. This secrecy does not preclude the President’s required reporting of his finding that the action
“is necessary to support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important to
the national security of the United States” to congressional intelligence committees in at least a
“timely fashion.” 50 U.S.C. § 413b(a) (2011). Congressional access to the information is strictly limited
by statute. Id. § 413b(c).
128. For more on the temporary nature of most deep secrets, see discussion supra note 18.
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programs. Their speculation might be wrong, perhaps even wildly wrong,
but it can affect the government’s broader legitimacy, and especially the
129
legitimacy of its secret programs. As the sociologist Georg Simmel
wrote, the “natural impulse to idealization, and the natural timidity of
men, operate to one and the same end in the presence of secrecy; viz., to
heighten it by phantasy, and to distinguish it by a degree of attention that
130
published reality could not command.” Secrecy thus cannot stop the
production of information and of meaning about government actions. It
can control information about “deep secrets” of which the public is fully
ignorant, but its success in doing so may prove only temporary. Once its
extraordinary efforts to retain secrets are revealed—that is, once the
government can no longer control information about its own secrecy—
the state faces greater resistance against its further efforts to control the
flow of government information and must satisfy a more skeptical public
131
that is more prone to speculation and investigation. In this regard, the
practice of keeping secrets itself constitutes information.
These are broad categories of the ways that secrecy fails. This
Article presents them here to lay the groundwork for the case studies
below. These studies illustrate the complex ways, both formal and
especially informal, by which secrecy proves difficult to maintain. Each
case exhibits the same pattern: the state fails to keep secrets despite its
extraordinary, legally permissible efforts to control information.

III. Vice President Cheney and the Executive Branch’s Imperfect
Information Control
This Part proceeds from the uncontroversial assumptions that the
George W. Bush administration attempted to protect executive branch
information more closely than any president since Richard Nixon, and
that within the Bush White House no figure appeared more obsessed

129. Kathryn S. Olmsted, Real Enemies: Conspiracy Theories and American Democracy,
World War I to 9–11 at 238–40 (2009); Kermit L. Hall, The Virulence of the National Appetite for
Bogus Revelation, 56 Md. L. Rev. 1, 36–38 (1997).
130. Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies, 11 Am. J. Soc. 441, 465 (1906).
131. In one recent episode, the Obama administration has continued to claim that its use of drone
aircraft to attack terrorists in foreign countries is classified and therefore exempt from the Freedom of
Information Act long after members of the administration have bragged of the program’s successes.
See Conor Friedersdorf, The Increasingly Absurd Conceit That Drone Strikes Are Secret, Atlantic
(June 22, 2012, 10:54 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/06/the-increasinglyabsurd-conceit-that-drone-strikes-are-secret/258842. It has done so despite the fact that the program’s
existence was extensively documented in a largely flattering portrayal in a prominent national
newspaper. See Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret “Kill List” Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and
Will, N.Y. Times, May 29, 2012, at A1. The administration’s unwillingness to concede the program’s
existence officially by declassifying relevant documents has delegitimzed its efforts to keep secrets
about other programs, as well as its commitment to transparency.
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with controlling information than Vice President Cheney. Although the
administration and Cheney ultimately hitched their obsession to the fastmoving expansion of military and intelligence operations in response to
133
they had begun to limit public and
the 2001 terrorist attacks,
congressional access to information well before then. During the first
months of Bush’s first term, Cheney sought to establish tight control over
executive branch information in his management of the administration’s
134
energy policy. Cheney won this legal battle, as the formal mechanisms
intended to limit secrecy could not contain the formal mechanisms that
135
allow it. This Part begins with a narrative telling of this control, which
includes a sketch of the theoretical justification that Cheney, among
others, developed for it. But the Vice President’s formal legal victories
could not foreclose the seepage of information from the executive
branch. The remainder of this Part describes the complex set of leaks—
along with journalists’ and advocates’ informed and uninformed inferences
about the work Cheney oversaw—that undercut the ideals that the Vice
President’s theory of executive privilege presumes. These leaks reveal how
Cheney’s effort functionally lost the battle he launched to control
information.
A. The Information Control Narrative
George W. Bush established the NEPDG soon after his
136
inauguration. The NEPDF was intended, as its name declared, to
organize the incoming administration’s development of a comprehensive
national energy policy. The task force was chaired by Vice President

132. See Michael Isikoff & David Corn, Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the
Selling of the Iraq War 423 (2006); Robert M. Pallitto & William G. Weaver, Presidential
Secrecy and the Law 46 (2007); Alasdair Roberts, The Collapse of Fortress Bush: The Crisis of
Authority in American Government 135–36 (2008); Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers:
Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 489, 491–92 (2007); Gia B. Lee, The President’s Secrets,
76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 197, 198 (2008).
133. Nancy V. Baker, General Ashcroft: Attorney at War 176–96 (2006).
134. Biographical studies of Cheney offer a general introduction to the episode, as well as an inside
glimpse of Cheney and the Office of the Vice President’s work on the energy policy task force. See
Barton Gellman, Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency 81–82, 90–94, 104–07 (2008); Stephen F.
Hayes, Cheney: The Untold Story of America’s Most Powerful and Controversial Vice
President 310–18, 323–27 (2007).
135. Expansive treatments of the legal and political issues in this episode, which are uniformly
critical of the administration and especially of the Vice President, include Fisher, supra note 47, at
183–96; Mark J. Rozell & Mitchel A. Sollenberger, Executive Privilege and the Bush Administration,
24 J.L. & Pol. 1, 12–27 (2008). See generally Eric R. Dannenmaier, Executive Exclusion and the
Cloistering of the Cheney Energy Task Force, 16 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 329 (2008).
136. Nat’l Energy Policy Dev. Grp., National Energy Policy: Reliable, Affordable, and
Environmentally Sound Energy for America’s Future viii (2001) [hereinafter NEPDG Report].
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137

Cheney and run by members of Cheney’s staff. The project did not
begin from a blank slate: one of the Bush campaign’s early key policy
goals was to prioritize energy development over environmental concerns,
and a unit of President Bush’s post-election transition team had begun to
138
develop an energy policy for the incoming administration. Given the
issue’s significance, the administration clearly viewed NEPDG’s
formation as a key moment in the early days of the new presidency. The
task force’s membership included presidential cabinet members who
directed the agencies that would implement many of the group’s
recommendations, as well as high-ranking appointees in the Executive
Office of the President who would oversee and organize presidential
139
oversight of the resulting energy policy. The Vice President would
ultimately lead a centralized, top-down policy development process in
which the President’s and especially the Vice President’s preferences
140
would drive the committee’s deliberations and conclusions.
The task force only existed briefly, and disbanded when its final
report was released four months after its formation. During that period,
however, its principals met with hundreds of corporate executives and
interest group representatives, the vast majority of whom represented
141
the energy industry and especially the extractive industries. Task force
members and staff almost entirely ignored environmental organizations,
142
and any access the latter enjoyed to NEPDG was pro forma. Indeed,
the final report’s most significant prescriptions reflected the extractive
industries’ preferences. It advocated efforts to seek new domestic sources
of oil and gas, including on public lands (such as the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge) and offshore, and diplomatic and commercial efforts to
forge global trade alliances that would expand American access to
143
foreign oil. It also championed regulatory support for the expansion of
137. Hayes, supra note 134, at 311–13; Mike Allen & Dana Milbank, Cheney’s Role Offers
Strengths and Liabilities, Wash. Post, May 17, 2001, at A1.
138. Gary C. Bryner, The National Energy Policy: Assessing Energy Policy Choices, 73 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 341, 343 (2002); Susan Milligan, Energy Bill a Special-Interests Triumph, Bos. Globe, Oct. 4,
2004, at A1.
139. NEPDG Report, supra note 136, at v.
140. See Gen. Accounting Office, Energy Task Force: Process Used to Develop the National
Energy Policy 6–8 (2003) [hereinafter Energy Task Force Report]; Gellman, supra note 134, at 88–
91; Ron Suskind, The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of
Paul O’Neill 146–49 (2004); Allen & Milbank, supra note 137, at A1.
141. See Michael Abramowitz & Steven Mufson, Papers Detail Industry’s Role in Cheney’s Energy
Report, Wash. Post, July 18, 2007, at A1.
142. Id.
143. See NEPDG Report, supra note 136, at 5-20 to 5-22 (summarizing recommendations for
increasing domestic energy supply); id. at 8-1 to 8-3 (discussing “Strengthening Global Alliances”). For
summaries of the policy, see Bryner, supra note 138, at 359–80; Michael T. Klare, The Bush/Cheney
Energy Strategy: Implications for U.S. Foreign and Military Policy, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 395,
397–403 (2004). For the immediate political reaction to it, see Joseph Curl, Bush Sees Dual Goals of
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nuclear power generation. Although such prescriptions may have proved
politically controversial and widely contested as a matter of policy—
particularly for environmental groups opposed to many of NEPDG’s
priorities—the report’s substantive conclusions and influence on policy
seemed to represent the standard stuff of policy development for a first144
term Republican president. They could not have surprised anyone.
The task force’s intentional and well-planned commitment to
145
secrecy, however, was both controversial and surprising. NEPDG did
not open its meetings and deliberations to the public, nor did it provide a
list of the private entities and individuals with whom it met to the public,
press, or even Congress. Cheney also directed the energy industry
executives with whom he and NEPDG met not to mention their
146
involvement in the NEPDG to the press or public.
This informational strategy was itself part of Cheney’s strong
commitment to implementing a constitutional theory of unitary executive
147
The theory began to emerge as a prevailing concept in
power.
contemporary conservative constitutional theory with then-Representative
Cheney’s direction of the Minority Report to Congress’s formal
investigation of the Iran-Contra affair, which concerned the Reagan
administration’s covert operation to evade legislative restrictions on
148
supporting Nicaraguan Contra rebels through secret arms sales to Iran.
Focusing largely upon the extent of the President’s sole authority over
foreign affairs, the Minority Report discussed why the President must be
free from extensive congressional intervention—whether from direct
congressional oversight or from legislation that would force the executive
149
branch to open itself to public view. Its claim did not connect the
President’s prerogative to a particular, well-defined legal authority or
doctrine, nor did it limit its reach to trump particular legislative enactments

Energy, Environment, Wash. Times, May 18, 2001, at A1; Carolyn Lochhead, Bush Faces Tough Fight
on Energy Strategy—Reaction: Criticism from Environmentalists, S.F. Chron., May 18, 2001, at A1.
144. See Lou Dubose & Jake Bernstein, Vice: Dick Cheney and the Hijacking of the American
Presidency 6 (2006).
145. See Suskind, supra note 140, at 143–44.
146. See Gellman, supra note 134, at 92.
147. Roberts, supra note 10, at 62–64.
148. Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, H.R.
Rep. No. 100-433, S. Rep. No. 100-216, at 431–585 (1987) [hereinafter Iran-Contra Affair Report].
For narrative accounts of Cheney’s intellectual development that place the Minority Report at its
center, see Harold H. Bruff, Bad Advice: Bush’s Lawyers in the War on Terror 58–59 (2009);
Dick Cheney & Liz Cheney, In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir 143–48 (2011); Jack
Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration 86–88
(2007); Stephen Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A Developmental
Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 2070, 2098–2100 (2009) (tying the Minority
Report to the “unitary executive” theory).
149. Iran-Contra Affair Report, supra note 148, at 457–469.
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that constrained the President; rather, using an amorphous ideal of
separate powers, the Minority Report reasoned both formalistically and
tautologically that the President has the inherent power within his
150
separate and distinct sphere of authority because he is the President:
the elected leader of an essential, wholly independent unit with muscular,
151
well-defined powers.
An integral element of this concept is the President’s legal and
political control over executive branch information—an argument that
Cheney had pressed while a White House aide during the Ford
152
administration. The President must be able to have significant control
over when and how the information on which he relies and the
153
information that he produces is disclosed, as he is best suited to take
decisive action with the “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch” that
foreign policy and other key tasks delegated by the Constitution to the
154
President often require. The multi-headed fractious Congress, by
contrast, can neither act decisively nor keep its plans or the information
that it receives secret, and therefore should have limited access to certain
kinds of information and no authority to undercut the President’s ability to
155
keep secrets. And it was in the struggle over energy policy information
that Cheney began his effort from within the White House to establish this
theory’s preeminence in the executive branch and in the courts.
B. The Legal Fight Over NEPDG Information
In May 2001, in response to a request from two Democratic
members of Congress, the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”)
156
began to investigate the membership of NEPDG. Using its broad

150. Id. at 387–92, 457–59 (citing The Federalist No. 48 (James Madison)).
151. The key works in contemporary unitary executive theory began to appear in the decade after
the Minority Report. See generally Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses As Power Grants, 88 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 1377 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power To
Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 570–99 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153 (1992).
152. Bruce P. Montgomery, Subverting Open Government: White House Materials and
Executive Branch Politics 5 (2006); Charlie Savage, Takeover: The Return of the Imperial
Presidency and the Subversion of American Democracy 34–38 (2007).
153. See Dick Cheney, Congressional Overreaching in Foreign Policy, in Foreign Policy and the
Constitution 101, 115 (Robert A. Goldwin & Robert A. Licht eds., 1990).
154. Iran-Contra Affair Report, supra note 148, at 459–60 (quoting The Federalist No. 70
(Alexander Hamilton)); see also id. at 468 (citing The Federalist No. 64 (John Jay) (advocating that
the President, not the Senate, should have the sole power to negotiate foreign treaties because of his
ability to maintain secrecy)).
155. Id. at 437–38, 576–79.
156. Walker v. Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 2002); Jerry Seper, Justice Asks Court to
Dismiss GAO Suit Against Cheney, Wash. Times, May 23, 2002, at A3.
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statutory authority to investigate executive branch expenditures, the
158
GAO formally requested NEPDG’s records. Cheney and his legal
counsel, David Addington, denied the GAO’s request, declaring first to
the GAO and then ultimately to Congress that such congressional
demands for information “intrude into the heart of Executive
159
deliberations,” and that the documents were constitutionally privileged.
The denial provoked the Comptroller General, who leads the GAO, to
take the unprecedented step of filing suit against the Vice President to
160
demand the records’ disclosure.
The Vice President deployed the same strategy to defeat claims that
the NEPDG owed any duty to reveal information directly to the press
and public. Executive branch control had been intentionally embedded
in NEPDG’s structure and organizational DNA, as Addington had
specifically designed NEPDG to avoid falling within the purview of the
161
Federal Advisory Committee Act (the “FACA”), the federal statute
that imposes open record and open meeting obligations on advisory
committees within the executive branch that are not entirely composed
162
of federal employees. In June 2001, while Cheney was in the midst of
his dispute with the GAO over disclosures to Congress, Judicial Watch (a
conservative governmental watchdog group) and the Sierra Club (an
environmental group) submitted requests under the FOIA and FACA
163
for the same documents that the GAO sought. After their requests
were denied, these groups separately filed suit against NEPDG and a
panoply of officials associated with it, claiming, among other things,
164
violations of FOIA and FACA.
Cheney ultimately won all of his legal battles to keep NEPDG’s
internal records secret. The GAO litigation ended in December 2002
after the trial court granted Cheney’s motion to dismiss the Comptroller
General’s complaint, ruling that he lacked standing to sue under
165
Article III. Defeated during the post-9/11 period and following a
midterm election that saw the administration’s political popularity and
governmental authority rise to great heights, the GAO decided not to

157. See 31 U.S.C. § 712 (2006) (requiring the Comptroller General to investigate executive agency
expenditures of public money).
158. Jeff Gerth, Accounting Office Demands Energy Task Force Records, N.Y. Times, July 19,
2001, at A20; Jerry Seper, Justice Asks Court to Dismiss GAO Suit Against Cheney, Wash. Times,
May 23, 2002, at A3.
159. See Gellman, supra note 134, at 104; see also Walker, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 57.
160. See Walker, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 54.
161. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2006).
162. Gellman, supra note 134, at 91; Hayes, supra note 134, at 313–14.
163. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat’l Energy Policy Dev. Grp., 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 25 (D.D.C. 2002).
164. Id.
165. See Walker, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 74–75.
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appeal, although it has continued to assert that the court’s decision was
166
incorrect.
Though more legally and procedurally complicated, the Judicial
Watch and Sierra Club suits, which were consolidated and concerned
requests for documents from officials affiliated with NEPDG besides the
Vice President, met a similar fate as the GAO’s suit. Having defeated
167
some of the defendants’ motions to dismiss in district court, the
plaintiffs appeared poised to begin receiving through civil discovery the
NEPDG documents that they hoped would assist them in their claim that
FACA applied to NEPDG. The Vice President immediately sought a
writ of mandamus from the D.C. Circuit that would halt the District
Court’s discovery order on the grounds that it constituted a breach of
executive authority and privilege that violated the constitutional
168
separation of powers. Although he lost in the D.C. Circuit, Cheney
169
prevailed in the Supreme Court. The Court held both that the D.C.
170
Circuit could issue a writ of mandamus, and that the District Court’s
discovery order to assist plaintiffs in pursuit of their claims was not
171
narrow enough. On remand, the D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, issued
172
the writ and directed the case’s dismissal. Strictly construing FACA in
light of the separation of powers concerns, the court held that the group
was not an advisory committee subject to FACA because only its official
members, all of whom were government employees, could vote on matters
173
before the NEPDG.
Cheney emerged victorious from his battles with Congress and the
public interest groups that sought to open the energy policy he oversaw.
His success seemed to validate his long-term strategy of establishing
control over executive branch information, which he carried out through
NEPDG’s institutional design and the aggressive litigation strategy that
turned initial legal setbacks into ultimate triumph. Cheney prevailed by
brandishing an expansive ideal of executive privilege over information.
His victory over Congress and public interest environmental groups sent
a signal to opponents: the White House would use its vast financial, legal,

166. See Energy Task Force Report, supra note 140, at 3 n.7; Peter M. Shane, Madison’s
Nightmare: How Executive Power Threatens American Democracy 126 (2009); Louis Fisher,
Congressional Access to Information: Using Legislative Will and Leverage, 52 Duke L.J. 323, 391–92
(2002); Peter Brand & Alexander Bolton, GOP Threats Halted GAO Cheney Suit, The Hill, Feb. 19,
2003, available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0219-12.htm.
167. Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 56–57.
168. In re Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
169. Cheney v. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 378 (2004).
170. Id. at 382, 391.
171. Id. at 387–88.
172. In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
173. Id. at 728.
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and political resources to resist the release of any information that it did
174
not want to disclose.
C. The Limits of Information Control
Cheney’s victories seemed to confirm his constitutional and political
theory of the executive branch’s paramount authority to control
information. It helped, of course, that his theory had already gained
significant purchase through republican appointments to the federal
175
bench and its circulation by conservative public law scholars in the
176
legal academy. But an administration cannot achieve full control over
the complex network of executive branch agencies that interacted with
the NEPDG merely through the support of a majority of appellate
177
judges in high-profile cases. The Bush administration had lost a
number of battles along the way to winning the various lawsuits seeking
information. By the time of the D.C. Circuit’s dismissal of the public
interest groups’ lawsuit under the FOIA and FACA, several agencies
had already complied with the District Court’s discovery orders, in the
process releasing some documents that Cheney continued to withhold to
178
the plaintiffs and therefore to the public. The National Resources
Defense Council obtained documents in early 2002 through a suit against
the Department of Energy that showed pervasive industry influence over
179
the resulting administration energy policy. Along with communications
174. See Gellman, supra note 134, at 93–94.
175. The separate Supreme Court opinions in Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004), line
up to some degree along a continuum, with Justices Ginsburg and Souter in dissent, Justice Stevens
offering a much more limited concurrence, a four justice plurality (with, to be sure, Justice Breyer
joining), and Justices Thomas and Scalia providing a partial concurrence that emphasized the serious
constitutional concerns for the separation of powers and the relative autonomy of the executive
branch if the public interest groups could proceed with discovery. See id. at 392 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); id. at 393–94 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 396 (Ginsburg,
J. dissenting). More strikingly, Republican appointees decided the key lower court decisions in the
administration’s favor. See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Energy, 412 F.3d 125, 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(Ginsburg, J.) (Reagan appointee); In re Cheney, 406 F.3d at 731 (en banc) (Randolph, J.) (George H.
W. Bush appointee); Walker v. Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d 51, 74–75 (D.D.C. 2002) (Bates, J.) (George
W. Bush appointee).
176. See Steven M. Teles, The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement 147–169 (2008). The
unitary executive theory has also made inroads into center-left jurisprudence, where a version holds
sway among proponents of a strong presidency to manage the administrative state. See Lawrence
Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 105–06 (1994);
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2252 (2001).
177. See generally Mark Fenster, Seeing the State: Transparency as Metaphor, 62 Admin. L. Rev.
617, 636–37 (2010) [hereinafter Fenster, Seeing the State] (noting how the sprawling complexity of the
federal administrative state makes transparency difficult to impose).
178. In re Cheney, 406 F.3d at 726 n.1.
179. See generally Order, Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. Dep’t of Energy, 191 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D. D.C.
2002) (granting plaintiff’s motion for release of responsive records); The Cheney Energy Task Force,
Nat’l Res. Defense Council (Mar. 27, 2002), http://www.nrdc.org/air/energy/taskforce/tfinx.asp. This
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between oil and gas lobbyists and NEPDG officials that demonstrated
180
the Group’s close relationship to industry, Judicial Watch obtained
from the Department of Commerce a series of maps documenting oil fields
and prospects for contracts and projects to extract oil in the Middle East,
181
including Iraq.
Other sources also allowed information to seep out. While the
NEPDG worked, major print media frequently discussed the
administration’s ties to the energy industry and predicted that these
182
favored interests would gain from Bush’s energy plan. At the same time,
183
NEPDG’s plans for its report were leaked to the press, which reported
that energy industry representatives, including Enron C.E.O. Kenneth
Lay, had met with the Vice President and others in the energy task
184
force. Indeed, Cheney’s effort to control information itself became an
important media story during the NEPDG’s existence, and the press
185
quickly identified secrecy as Cheney’s preferred political strategy. In
addition to the press’s extensive reporting on documents released in
connection with the NEPDG litigation showing the energy industry’s
186
influence on the administration’s energy policy, the New York Times

litigation endured until 2005, when the D.C. Circuit ruled in the Department of Energy’s favor.
Judicial Watch, 412 F.3d at 133.
180. Savage, supra note 152, at 86 (describing memoranda); Judicial Watch v. National Energy Policy
Development Group, et al., Judicial Watch, http://www.judicialwatch.org/cases/judicial-watch-v-nationalenergy-policy-development-group-et-al (June 27, 2012) (describing documents as the result of litigation).
181. Maps and Charts of Iraqi Oil Fields, Judicial Watch (Feb. 14, 2012),
http://www.judicialwatch.org/bulletins/maps-and-charts-of-iraqi-oil-fields.
182. Joseph Kahn & David E. Sanger, President Offers Plan to Promote Oil Exploration, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 30, 2001, at A1; Jim VandeHei, Democrats Take Aim at Bush Weak Spot: Administration’s
Ties to Energy Industry, Wall St. J., May 16, 2001, at A24; Dan Morgan, Coal Scores With Wager on
Bush, Wash. Post, Mar. 25, 2001, at A05; Tom Hamburger, Laurie McGinley, & David Cloud,
Influence Market: Industries That Backed Bush Are Now Seeking Return on Investment, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 6, 2001, at A1.
183. See e.g., Peter Behr & Alan Sipress, Energy Panel Seeks Review of Sanctions & Oil Production in
Iraq, Iran and Libya Seen as Critical, Wash. Post, Apr. 19, 2001, at A13; Bob Davis, Bush Energy Plan
Increases Reliance on Nuclear Power—Task Force Aims to Boost Supplies of Natural Gas with Pipelines,
Drilling, Wall St. J., Apr. 9, 2001, at A3; Kahn & Sanger, supra note 182, at A1.
184. See Bob Davis & Rebecca Smith, Power Politics: In Era of Deregulation, Enron Woos
Regulators More Avidly Than Ever—CEO Lay Leaves an Imprint on Bush Energy Plan, Seeks Friends
at FERC—An Interstate for Electricity, Wall St. J., May 18, 2001, at A1; Kahn & Sanger, supra note
182; Mike Allen & Dana Milbank, Cheney’s Role Offers Strengths and Liabilities, Wash. Post, May 17,
2001, at A1; Dana Milbank & Eric Pianin, Energy Task Force Works in Secret; Like Clinton Health
Effort, Cheney Group Aims to Limit Leaks, Flak, Wash. Post, Apr. 16, 2001, at A1.
185. See Milbank & Pianin, supra note 184.
186. See Dana Milbank, Bush Energy Order Wording Mirrors Oil Lobby’s Proposal; Directive
Targeted Regulations With “Adverse Effects”, Wash. Post, Mar. 28, 2002, at A27; Dana Milbank &
Mike Allen, Energy Task Force Belatedly Consulted Environmentalists; Documents Show
Administration Sought Input Only After Protests, Wash. Post, Mar. 27, 2002, at A02; Mike Allen,
Cheney, Aides Met With Enron 6 Times in 2001; Counsel: Energy Policy Was Topic, Wash. Post,
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revealed that eighteen of the top twenty-five contributors to the
Republican Party enjoyed special access to the NEPDG—including, in
187
Enron’s case, access to the Vice President himself. Less than eighteen
months later, the GAO issued its report on the process that NEPDG
used to draft its report, which authoritatively documented Cheney’s
tight-fisted control of the NEPDG, as well as contacts among the Office
of the Vice President, other principal NEPDG members, and energy
188
industry executives and representatives. The GAO report also revealed
the Vice President’s efforts to keep the NEPDG’s work secret.
Cheney’s failed efforts to control information paralleled the
NEPDG’s failure as a political entity. Vocal and institutional opposition
to what many suspected would emerge as the administration’s energy
policy coalesced soon after the NEPDG’s formation, raising doubts
about whether the administration would offer anything more than
189
industry’s preferred policies. The NEPDG Report did not influence
Congress, as a bill that the administration supported and the Republicancontrolled House had passed failed in the Senate, which had a bare
190
majority of Democrats, while the Senate passed its own energy bill. It
was not until 2005, after President Bush’s reelection and with larger
Republican majorities in both houses of Congress, that Congress finally
enacted a new energy bill—one that, notably, did not include some of the
most controversial NEPDG proposals, such as opening the Arctic
191
National Wildlife Refuge to drilling. Public opinion polls taken soon
after the Report’s release suggested that the Report also failed to

Jan. 9, 2002, at A3; Don Van Natta, Jr. & Neela Banerjee, Bush Energy Paper Followed Industry Push,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 2002, at A20.
187. Don Van Natta, Jr. & Neela Banerjee, Top G.O.P. Donors in Energy Industry Met Cheney
Panel, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 2002, at A1.
188. Energy Task Force Report, supra note 140, at 6–8, 15–18.
189. See Jeanne Cummings, Power Politics: Energy Crisis Offers Clues to the Workings of Bush
Administration—Cheney Does Heavy Lifting and Bush Rides Agenda; Taste for Horse-Trading—“A
Lot of Pain in the West”, Wall St. J., Feb. 16, 2001, at A1; John J. Fialka & Jeanne Cummings, White
House Sets Cabinet-Level Study to Develop a National Energy Policy, Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 2001, at A6;
Kahn & Sanger, supra note 182.
190. Eric Pianin, A Stinging Repudiation Engineered by 3 Democrats, Wash. Post, Apr. 19, 2002,
at A09. The Republican-controlled House of Representatives had introduced and passed a bill that
contained about eighty percent of the task force’s proposals soon after the NEPDG Report was issued.
See Juliet Eilperin & Eric Pianin, House GOP Energy Bill Trims President’s Plan, Wash. Post, Aug. 1,
2001, at A2. In late 2001, Senate Democrats introduced their own bill that focused on conservation,
efficiency, and developing new energy sources, which the Senate passed in April 2002. See Helen
Dewar, Senate Approves Energy Measure; Scaled-Back Bill Pushes Conservation, Wash. Post, Apr. 26,
2002, at A01. The two bills were never reconciled. Mike Allen, Bush’s Energy Plan Stalled; Partisan
Differences and President’s Priorities Created Impasse, Wash. Post, Aug. 23, 2003, at A06.
191. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005); See Charles Babington &
Justin Blum, On Capitol Hill, a Flurry of GOP Victories; Key Measures Advance After Long Delays,
Wash. Post, July 30, 2005, at A01.
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persuade the public that its prescriptions were objectively wise and worth
pursuing, as many Americans thought that Bush was “too closely tied to
192
the energy industry and insufficiently devoted to conservation.” The
NEPDG’s substantive prescriptions might have proved so unpopular and
politically untenable that even the most transparent and accessible
advisory committee that offered the same prescriptions would have
suffered the same fate. But secrecy certainly did not help the
administration’s efforts to sell its policy and might well have hurt them—
193
a hypothesis espoused even by some members of the administration.
Environmental non-governmental organizations likely agreed, as
they used the NEPDG’s secrecy, and their legal challenges to it, as both
symbol and evidence of the administration’s capture by oil and gas
interests. The Sierra Club, for example, trumpeted its litigation efforts to
its donors, using it as an opportunity to demonstrate its essential role in
194
fighting what it characterized as Cheney’s secretive, lawless behavior.
As one commentator sympathetically noted about the environmental
groups opposed to the Bush administration, the Sierra Club and the
National Resources Defense Counsel seemed more exercised about the
secretive and exclusionary process by which the energy policy had been
195
developed than about the policy itself. The stealth process, environmental
groups argued, suggested that more than mere policy was at stake in the
energy debate.
Administration critics generally viewed the NEPDG episode through
such inferences. The authors of Vice: Dick Cheney and the Hijacking of the
American Presidency characterized the NEPDG as “a governmentsanctioned industry cabal” that had drawn up a self-dealing and
destructive energy policy and had worked in secret to cover up the
196
corrupt enterprise. Some critics accused Cheney of trying to hide his
197
efforts to enrich his friends in the energy industry. Some imagined far
worse, particularly when viewing the NEPDG retrospectively through

192. Greg Hitt, Shailagh Murray, & Jeffrey Ball, Increasingly Skeptical Congress Takes up Bush
Energy Plan—NAS Study Deals Blow by Concluding Auto Makers Can Sharply Boost SUV Fuel
Economy, Wall St. J., July 31, 2001, at A20.
193. See Gellman, supra note 134, at 93; Hayes, supra note 134, at 324. Cf. Savage, supra note
152, at 90 (quoting associate White House counsel as acknowledging that the documents sought in the
litigation contained “nothing of interest”).
194. See, e.g., Sierra Club, Success Highlights: Celebrating Sierra Club’s 2010 Charitable
Victories 4 (2010) (identifying its role in litigation as evidence of its chairman’s “leadership”); Sierra
Club Found., 2004 Annual Report 6–7 (2004) (identifying its role in litigation as one of the year’s
“highlights”).
195. See Dannenmaier, supra note 135, at 375–76.
196. Dubose & Bernstein, supra note 144, at 21.
197. See Robert Bryce, Cronies: Oil, the Bushes, and the Rise of Texas, America’s Superstate
(2004); John W. Dean, Worse than Watergate, 42–53 (2004); Gellman, supra note 134, at 93–94;
John Nichols, Dick: The Man Who Is President (2004).
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the lens of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Both the existence of the Iraq
198
oilfields map that was disclosed in discovery, along with the fact that it
had been kept secret, suggested to critics that the war in Iraq and the
administration’s hawkish, neoconservative foreign policy were products
199
of the administration’s energy policy. Worse still, according to those
who believe the administration either knew or was involved in the 2001
terrorist attacks, the entire episode unveiled the administration’s secret
200
conspiracy to achieve global domination for an imperial America. Such
theories no doubt would have developed even in a more information-rich
environment where authoritative official documents and their
provenance were available and widely acknowledged. But they positively
blossomed in conditions that were defined by the grand, dramatic struggle
to obtain documentary evidence.
The Vice President may have thought he was controlling access to
information—an assumption that his most vociferous critics share—but
he could not contain either the circulation of information or the
interpretation of that which circulated. The most significant pre-9/11
battle over government secrecy and the executive branch’s authority to
control information demonstrated the power of laws protecting executive
privilege, the potential of formal laws and legal processes to force the
disclosure of information and to focus political pressure on the
government, and ultimately, the difficulty of keeping secrets.

IV. Redaction Failures: Imperfect Information Control in the
Release of Documents
Vice President Cheney sought to maximize the executive branch’s
legal authority to control executive branch information; by contrast,
some executive branch secrecy practices work within limits that the
Constitution and Congress set on the state’s ability to keep information
from the public. When it releases documents from which text has been
“redacted” (that is, obscured with a black mark or erased) for security
purposes, the executive branch simultaneously discloses information and
quite explicitly and clearly keeps it secret. The public can see the
document, it just cannot see every word—or perhaps any word at all if
the entire document or page has been redacted. An agency sometimes
redacts a document that it is otherwise required to release under a legal

198. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
199. Dubose & Bernstein, supra note 144, at 15–16; Jane Mayer, Contract Sport: What Did the
Vice-President Do for Halliburton?, New Yorker, Feb. 16, 2004, at 80.
200. See Jon Gold, The Facts Speak for Themselves, 911Truth.org (Sept. 25, 2008),
http://www.911truth.org/article_for_printing.php?story=20090104025547844; Michael Kane, Crossing
the Rubicon: Simplifying the Case Against Dick Cheney, FromTheWilderness.com (Jan. 18, 2005),
http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/011805_simplify_case.shtml.

Fenster_21 (M. Stevens) (Do Not Delete)

February 2014]

THE IMPLAUSIBILITY OF SECRECY

1/29/2014 6:39 PM

345

mandate; alternatively, an agency may not have been obliged to release a
redacted document but decided to declassify or make it public in an
effort to meet public expectations or enhance public understanding of an
issue. As a surgical removal of privileged information, redaction
constitutes a compromise, a second-best alternative to complete secrecy
that is better than nothing in this regard. But by making visible that
which is kept secret, redaction reveals secrecy’s machinery in ways that
the complete refusal to release a document does not. Paradoxically,
redactions allow citizens to see precisely what they cannot know.
This Part demonstrates that understanding redaction as selective but
complete censorship proves to be only partially correct given the myriad
ways in which redaction can fail. It begins with a discussion of how laws
enable government to use redactions as a strategy to retain control over
information, and then illustrates the ways that redaction has failed in
recent high-profile cases. It ends by demonstrating how even redaction’s
textual erasure still produces meaning.
A. Information Control and Release in Redaction Law
Government agencies redact information most frequently in
response to FOIA requests and as part of the review process of certain
employees’ publications. The Freedom of Information Act requires
federal agencies to provide “[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a
record” of documents when they rely upon one of FOIA’s exemptions to
201
deny a document request. Agencies must make their redactions explicit
and obvious by indicating the amount of deleted information, the
exemption that authorized the deletion, and, when possible, where in the
202
document the deletion occurred. Courts occasionally play an active role
203
in the redaction process.
The pre-publication review process that intelligence agencies use for
the public writings of their current and former employees also results in

201. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006); Ctr. for Auto Safety v. EPA, 731 F.2d 16, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“The
‘segregability’ requirement applies to all documents and all exemptions in the FOIA.”).
202. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
203. See, e.g., ACLU. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 738 F. Supp. 2d 93, 110–11 (D.D.C. 2010)
(finding that the agency did not sufficiently support full redactions of e-mails and ordering the agency
to “re-evaluate this document to ensure that only properly withheld information has been redacted
and either make greater disclosure of the content of the e-mail to the plaintiff or provide a more
detailed rationale” for withholding text). The fact that courts can inspect documents affected by
agency redactions and of which an agency denied disclosure does not require them to do so. See Nat’l
Labor Relations Bd. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 224 (1978). The D.C. Circuit in
particular grants trial courts broad discretion to decide how and to what extent they will conduct in
camera review. See Allen v. CIA, 636 F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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204

the disclosure of redacted documents. The Central Intelligence Agency
(the “CIA” or the “Agency”) has long required employees to sign secrecy
205
agreements as a condition of employment. These agreements include
provisions that require the employees to submit written manuscripts that
206
they plan to publish prior to publication. The CIA delegates manuscript
review to its Publications Review Board (“PRB”), which must respond to
207
the author within thirty days with proposed deletions. Although the
PRB’s approach has varied over time as different agency directors use
208
their discretion to set their secrecy policy preferences, some authors and
critics of the CIA have argued that the PRB over-redacts information,
209
especially when it supports criticism of CIA performance and policy.
Frustrated employees have challenged agency efforts to enforce the
210
secrecy agreements on First Amendment grounds, as well as on the
211
grounds that the redacted information is in fact not classified, or had

204. See generally John Hollister Hedley, Secrets, Free Speech, and Fig Leaves, 41 Stud. Intel. 75,
77-78, 83 n.1 (1998), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kentcsi/vol41no5/pdf/v41i5a04p.pdf (describing CIA’s pre-publication review process).
205. Michael L. Charlson, Comment, The Constitutionality of Expanding Prepublication Review of
Government Employees’ Speech, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 962 (1984)
206. See, e.g., Berntsen v. CIA, 618 F. Supp. 2d 27, 28 (D.D.C. 2009) (reproducing a prepublication review provision from an employment contract).
207. See United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 934 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Marchetti,
466 F.2d 1309, 1317 (4th Cir. 1972). The PRB often holds manuscripts beyond the deadline. See
A. John Radsan, Sed Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes: The CIA’s Office of General Counsel? 2 J. Nat’l.
Sec. L. & Pol’y 201, 239 n.121 (2008); see, e.g., Jason Vest, Ex-CIA Officer Heads to Court for Second
Time over Proposed Book, Gov. Exec. (Oct. 13, 2005), http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1005/
101305v1.htm (describing author’s frustration when PRB took ninety-eight days to return manuscript
with a long list of redactions). See generally Richard Willing, Spy Books Strain CIA Review Board,
USA Today (Apr. 30, 2007, 9:38 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-04-29-spybooks_N.htm (noting that in the period between 2000 and 2007, the number of manuscripts increased
four-fold, and between 1980 and 2007, it has increased twelve-fold).
208. Radsan, supra note 207, at 241–42; Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, CIA Crackdown Seeks to
Tighten Agency’s Secrecy, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 2006, at A1.
209. See Scott Shane, C.I.A. Fighting Memoir of 9/11 By F.B.I. Agent, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 2011, at
A1 (reporting complaints from a former Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”) agent about CIA
redactions to his manuscript); Laura Miller, Censored by the CIA: A 23-Year-Old Veteran of the
Agency Reveals How the Vetting Process is Used to Stifle Critics of the War, Salon (Aug. 30, 2011,
5:31 PM), http://www.salon.com/2011/08/31/censored_by_cia (interviewing former CIA agent
complaining about intimidation in the PRB review process); Dana Priest, Suing Over the CIA’s Red
Pen; Retired Operative Says Agency Unfairly Edited His Book, Wash. Post, Oct. 9, 2006, at A15
(recounting a former CIA agent’s threat from the CIA’s executive director that the agency would
“‘redact the [expletive] out of your book’” because of its criticism of the CIA).
210. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (upholding the CIA’s pre-publication
review process as a “reasonable means” of restricting an employee’s ability to speak not only because
of the voluntary nature of the secrecy agreement that its employees sign, but also due to the agency’s
“compelling interest” in protecting classified intelligence information essential to national security).
211. McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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been officially disclosed previously, or had been properly classified —
but such challenges do not often prevail.
Redaction’s legal authorities thus assume the following: disclosure
and secrecy are appropriate, within reason. The two can be reconciled
through an agency’s precise control of information, down to the page, line,
and word whose redaction will keep secret dangerous content. Wielding its
black pen or eraser, the government can limit disclosure’s ill effects.
B. How Redaction Fails
Redaction can fail in a variety of ways, however. The information that
214
it tries to suppress might already be in the public domain. The
information can also subsequently leak out or can be inferred from the
215
document or the context in which the redaction appears. The redactions
might not successfully suppress information due to bureaucratic conflict
216
and sometimes technical errors. Agencies cannot extend the redaction
that they are authorized to make to documents outside their control. This
Subpart illustrates that despite its status as an explicit form of
information control, redaction often reveals secrecy’s malfunction.
Redaction’s failure thus illustrates the difficulty of maintaining secrecy
and questions the effort to protect information.
Consider first the redactions to former CIA agent Valerie Plame
217
Wilson’s best selling memoirs. Wilson’s career had ended when
unauthorized leaks to news agencies by members of the Bush
212. Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v.
Dep’t of the Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 421 (2d Cir. 1989).
213. Stillman v. CIA, 319 F.3d 546, 548 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
214. See infra notes 276–285 (providing examples).
215. For example, the New York Times obtained an un-redacted copy of an internal government history
of U.S. efforts to capture Nazis after World War II; the copy revealed significant amounts of information that
the Justice Department had redacted in a version it released in response to FOIA litigation. See Eric
Lichtblau, Secret Papers Detail U.S. Aid for Ex-Nazis, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 2010, at A1.
216. This can happen with commercial software programs. See Nat’l Sec. Agency, Redaction of
PDF Files Using Adobe Acrobat Professional X at 1; Jaikumar Vijayan, Analysis: TSA Document
Release Show Pitfalls of Electronic Redaction, Computerworld (Dec. 11, 2009, 7:18 AM),
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9142141/Analysis_TSA_document_release_show_pitfalls_of_
electronic_redaction. The problem predates electronic files and redaction; when redaction was on
paper, it was sometimes possible to peer past the black mark at the underlying text. See Scott Shane,
Spies Do a Huge Volume of Work in Invisible Ink, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 2007, at A4. The problem is
not peculiar to American government. See, e.g., Dan Levine & Carlyn Kolker, Exclusive: Apple versus
Samsung Ruling Divulges Secret Details, Reuters, Dec. 6, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/12/06/us-apple-samsung-ruling-idUSTRE7B425D20111206 (describing court order in
private litigation that failed to redact proprietary information); David Millward & Thomas Harding,
Secrets Put on Internet in Whitehall Blunders, Telegraph (Apr. 17, 2011, 10:00 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8457506/Secrets-put-on-internet-in-Whitehallblunders.html (reporting that secrets about British nuclear submarines posted online in redacted
documents could be revealed by copying and pasting them in new documents).
217. See generally Valerie Plame Wilson, Fair Game (2007).
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administration identified her as a covert agent in an effort to disparage
her husband, a former diplomat who publicly challenged evidence
proffered by the administration of Saddam Hussein’s efforts to build
218
weapons of mass destruction. The resulting scandal paradoxically
transformed Valerie Plame Wilson from secret spy to public celebrity,
and she sold the rights to her memoirs to a major publishing house for
219
$2.5 million. Upon reviewing her manuscript prior to publication, the
CIA’s PRB required significant redactions, including of factual
information about Wilson’s career that had been published in popular
news accounts and in an unclassified letter from a CIA official that was
220
published in the Congressional Record. After losing her administrative
221
and legal appeals of the redactions, Wilson and her publisher decided
to release the book with large portions of the text hidden behind dull
grey lines that represented the censored material. The book’s main text
thus has whole pages of redactions, as well as pages that combine visible
text and single-word or line-by-line redactions. Two chapter titles are
blacked out. Parts of Wilson’s life story, including her husband’s
courtship of her and parts of her account of the PRB process itself, are so
222
thoroughly edited as to be almost incomprehensible. The book’s
redactions stand in protest of a secrecy policy to which Wilson objected,
forcing the reader to make sense of an explicitly censored text. They
make plain that Wilson had lost control of the telling of her own life.
But the book also demonstrates the absurdity and imperfections of
the government’s censorship efforts. Much of the content that the CIA
had forbidden Wilson to publish appears in an afterword written by
Laura Rozen, a foreign policy and intelligence reporter who relied for
her nearly one-hundred-page contribution on open source materials and
223
personal interviews of others who knew Wilson. The CIA could not
limit Rozen’s access to her sources, and it had no mechanism to censor
her use of them in the afterword. For example, one of the most
significant pieces of information redacted from the main text was the
country where Wilson worked undercover and any details that would

218. See Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 701–02 (D.C. Cir. 2008); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith
Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1143–44 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Gellman, supra note 134, at 360–64.
219. Motoko Rich, Valerie Plame Gets Book Deal, N.Y. Times (May 5, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/05/books/05cnd-plame.html.
220. Wilson gives a full account of the PRB process in the memoir. See Wilson, supra note 217, at
264–81.
221. See Wilson v. CIA, 586 F.3d 171, 196 (2d Cir. 2009) (dismissing Wilson’s claims that because
the CIA’s redactions included information in the public record, the redactions violated the First
Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act).
222. Wilson, supra note 217, at 270–73.
223. See Laura Rozen, Afterword to Wilson, Fair Game, supra note 217, at 307–89; see also
Wilson, Fair Game, supra note 217, at ix (explaining Rozen’s afterword).
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allow a reader to identify the country; indeed, chapters 2 and 3, which
cover her early years in the agency, are among the most heavily redacted.
As we learn in Rozen’s afterword, however, Wilson spent six years
undercover in Greece, a fact that was known to Wilson’s family
(although they did not know that she worked for the CIA at that time),
224
and one that had been widely reported in the news. The reader can
learn from Rozen’s afterword that the information about how she met
and ultimately married her husband had appeared in Joseph Wilson’s
225
memoir, which had been published three years earlier. Fair Game also
included an appendix that reproduces public documents, including
correspondence between the CIA’s PRB and her attorneys, court filings,
and entries from the Congressional Record that included information
226
Wilson could not get past the PRB’s censors. The documents provide
further details about Wilson’s service in the CIA and the PRB review
process that were redacted in her portion of the memoirs. Readers
thereby have access to much of the information that the agency had
227
sought to redact.
Bureaucratic indifference and conflict rather than absurdly excessive
censorship caused another recent redaction failure. Operation Dark Heart,
Anthony Shaffer’s memoir of his experiences as a Defense Intelligence
Agency (“DIA”) officer in the war in Afghanistan, initially went to press
228
without significant censorship after prepublication review by the Army.
As the book was set to be released, however, the DIA and other
intelligence agencies sought to stop its publication, asserting that it
contained classified information, the release of which could be harmful
to national security. The Pentagon purchased and destroyed ten thousand
printed copies of the book’s original edition, while the book’s publisher
229
arranged to publish a second edition with the newly required redactions.
The censorship failed, however, because a limited number of
230
advance copies of the original edition were already in circulation.
Those with both copies could identify precisely what the DIA had
redacted. An investigative news website posted numerous pages from
both editions for a side-by-side comparison, revealing many of the

224. See id. at 319–31.
225. Id. at 351–52; Joseph Wilson, The Politics of Truth 239–43 (2004).
226. See Wilson, supra note 217, at 392–402.
227. See Janet Maslin, Her Identity Revealed, Her Story Expurgated, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 2007, at
E1 (book review describing dispute with CIA, and characterizing the afterword as “fill[ing] in some of
the gaps” created by the redactions).
228. Scott Shane, Pentagon Tries to Corner Book to Keep Secrets, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 2010, at A16.
229. Scott Shane, In Censored Book’s Reprint, Pentagon Redacts Some Not-So-Secret Secrets, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 18, 2010, at A9.
230. Id.
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classified “secrets” that the DIA hoped to hide. By January 2013, the
Department of Defense had partially reversed course again, declaring that
many of the redactions had subsequently been declassified while retaining
232
classification for many of the others.
As with the Wilson memoir, the state could not successfully keep
everything it sought to suppress secret because some of it had already
become public. In its afterword and appendix, Fair Game makes this
explicit by revealing some of the redacted information. Similarly, a
reader who knows or stumbles upon the story behind Operation Dark
Heart can more directly and literally find the unredacted text online.
233
These are exceptional cases—though not unique ones. They reveal the
difficulties that the state confronts as it complies with formal statutory and
constitutional limitations on secrecy, and as it attempts to overcome the
informal checks on secrecy—official and unofficial leaks, intrepid
investigative reporting, the activities of political opponents, and
bureaucratic conflict and bungling.
C. Redaction’s Meaning
Redaction can fail not only to keep the actual text hidden under the
redactions from the public—but also to stop the public from reading, and
reading into, the covering lines themselves, which themselves produce
meaning. As the anthropologist Michael Powell has written, redaction
“transforms the way we read these documents, sparking curiosity and
234
often stirring skeptical, critical, and even cynical readings.” Few
readers will share Valerie Wilson’s personal sense of betrayal and
outrage at the CIA’s PRB process of Fair Game, but many will wonder at
the CIA’s motivations and rationality in its extraordinary efforts to
redact information that was readily available. Readers are also likely to
speculate, whether in an informed or uninformed manner, about what
lies under the black marks and about the government’s motivations in

231. See Redacted and Unredacted Side-by-Side of ‘Operation Dark Heart’, ProPublica,
http://www.propublica.org/documents/item/redacted-and-unredacted-side-by-side-of-operation-darkheart; see also Anthony Shaffer, Index to Operation Dark Heart, available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2010/09/dark-index.pdf (providing a side-by-side comparison of redacted
and unredacted versions of the book’s index).
232. See Steven Aftergood, Pentagon Relaxes Censorship of Afghan War Memoir, Secrecy News
(Jan. 24, 2013, 1:44 P.M.), http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2013/01/dark_heart_declass.html.
233. See, e.g., WikiLeaks Diplomatic Cables FOIA Documents, Am. Civil Liberties Union,
http://www.aclu.org/wikileaks-diplomatic-cables-foia-documents (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) (comparing
redacted diplomatic cables obtained by FOIA with unredacted documents obtained by WikiLeaks,
claiming that the latter show “the government’s selective and self-serving decisions to withhold
information” via redaction).
234. Michael G. Powell, xxxxx Out: Our Cultural Romance with Redacted Documents, Believer
Mag., June 2010, at 23, 24.
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redacting the text. Sometimes informed speculation will prove accurate;
sometimes it will lead the public to imagine the worst, perhaps by
assuming the existence of a conspiracy or official incompetence where
neither existed—or where the state in fact has done something equally,
236
though differently, culpable. Even when redaction successfully censors
information, it cannot obstruct the process of meaning-production about
the text that it hides.
Black blots on a document divorced from consideration of the
content that they hide can also create meaning separate from the hidden
content, as contemporary artists have shown by playing with redaction’s
signification in their work. In his FBI Files series (2000–02), the painter
Arnold Mesches appropriated documents that he obtained from the
investigatory files the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the “FBI”) had
produced in their surveillance of his political activities in the 1950s and
237
1960s. Intermixing the documents into collages with paintings of
arresting images from the culture and politics of the era, his works
comment on the state that surveilled and infiltrated his life. The collages
find beauty in the detritus of official action and satirize the secret,
paranoid world in which J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI thrived. Similarly, Jenny
Holzer’s recent series Redaction Paintings painstakingly reproduce, in oil
paint on linen and in larger size than the original paper, declassified,
redacted documents about detainee abuse obtained through FOIA
238
requests filed by the ACLU. In a 2004 exhibition, Holzer projected
onto the faces of buildings in the German city of Bregenz redacted
documents from the Bush administration that explained and authorized
239
the Global War on Terror. Each set of visual works demonstrates how
redactions perform a literal but partial censorship alongside disclosure,
while they allow the redactions’ black marks and blots to reveal the
invisible but programmatic physical violence that the documents
240
record. Mesches described the inspiration provided by “the sheer
aesthetic beauty of the [redacted] pages themselves—the bold, black,
slashing, eradicating strokes” that look like artistic renderings made by
241
the menacing bureaucratic police apparatus. In reproducing redacted
documents as art, he and Holzer reveal redactions’ fruitful censorship,
which in their work comes to represent the enormity of the security state

235. See infra Part V.B.2 (describing historians’ efforts to infer the meaning of redactions).
236. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
237. See generally Arnold Mesches, The FBI Files, 15 Pub. Culture 287 (2003).
238. See generally Jenny Holzer, Redaction Paintings (2006).
239. See Jenny Holzer et al., Truth Before Power (2004).
240. Joseph Slaughter, Vanishing Points: When Narrative Is Not Simply There, 9 J. Hum. Rts. 207,
211 (2010).
241. Mesches, supra note 237, at 292.
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that the Cold War and post-9/11 reaction produced, as well as the
tremendous efforts the security state takes to keep itself secret.
The same proves true in published texts that reproduce or create
redactions. Wilson’s Fair Game is not the only book that has used
extensive black marks to comment on state censorship. Former CIA
agent Joseph Weisberg’s 2007 novel An Ordinary Spy, which narrates the
story of an incompetent, conscience-wracked American spy, includes
almost as many redactions as Wilson’s Fair Game, but unlike the latter,
242
Weisberg redacted his own text to heighten the book’s authenticity.
According to one account, the book’s black bars “concealed the names of
countries, the particulars of tradecraft and other details that might be
243
classified information, if the story were true.” But the novel was
fabricated; Weisberg removed most of the material to which the PRB
would have objected, and the board redacted only a little more than what
Weisberg had not himself redacted. Moreover, as a novelist, Weisberg
could have simply created unobjectionable material to replace that which
244
the PRB redacted. Instead, he seemed to hope that redaction would
increase the reader’s pleasure and sense of the novel’s accurate portrayal
of the spy’s daily life, even as it blacked the details of that life out.
Mesches and Holzer, who are more critical of the documents they
reproduce than Weisberg, make use of blots and black lines that signify
as well as censor. For all three, redactions create meaning even as they
attempt to control information. As this Part has illustrated and the next
will further show, redaction often fails to achieve its goal.
V. “Secret History”: The Struggle to Control Information About
Covert Operations
By definition, covert state actions are secret. A means by which the
President and intelligence community attempt to change the course of
history without leaving any historical traces, they are designed and
executed in order to be the most unknown of the unknowns. The issue of
whether the state should make later disclosures of their existence and
details generates fierce debate between historians and members of the
245
intelligence community. As the next Subpart explains, the government

242. See Alex Beam, Espionage realist, Yale Alumni Mag., Sept./Oct. 2011, at 43, 44 (characterizing
the redactions as a “major conceit” of the novel and noting that he made most of them).
243. Motoko Rich, From Undercover to Between the Covers, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 2007, at B9
(emphasis added).
244. Id.
245. See, e.g., Warren F. Kimball, Openness and the CIA, 44 Stud. Intel. 63 (2001) (arguing for
disclosure of past covert actions from the perspective of a diplomatic historian); N. Richard Kinsman,
Openness and the Future of the Clandestine Service, 44 Stud. Intel. 55 (2001) (arguing against
disclosure from the perspective of a retired CIA official).
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has committed itself to disclose some of its past covert activities. But
these efforts to make historical documents available have faced formal
and informal resistance through law and bureaucratic recalcitrance that
protect some degree of secrecy about the official past. After introducing
the various means by which the federal government attempts to keep
some of its historical secrets while making others public, this Part offers a
case study of the complex struggle that the executive branch and
especially the intelligence community have undertaken to keep secret the
United States’ covert role in directing the 1954 coup in Guatemala, a key
moment in American Cold War history. This “secret history” reveals the
difficulty and even implausibility of controlling information about past
covert actions.
A. Public Secrets and Public History Law
The United States has long tried, for different reasons and to varied
effect, to make public its secret history. The State Department has
published the Foreign Relations of the United States (“FRUS”) series, an
official documentary record of foreign policy decisions and diplomatic
247
activity, more or less continuously since 1861. The FRUS carries on a
longstanding tradition of State Department documentary reports to
248
Congress that dates back to the early Republic. Since World War II,
however, the FRUS has faced a more complicated political environment,
while at the same time it has needed to document America’s greatly
changed geo-political position and its vastly larger State and Defense
Departments and intelligence services. This has resulted in a FRUS
249
publication process fraught with political and bureaucratic conflict. To
address these concerns, the State Department formed a permanent
250
advisory committee composed of academic historians in 1957, and, more
recently, Congress enacted legislation requiring the State Department to
engage more thoroughly with academic historians and to declassify

246. The post-Watergate period saw the most extensive disclosures of American covert actions.
See generally Kathryn S. Olmsted, Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate
Investigations of the CIA and FBI (1996).
247. 22 U.S.C. § 4351(a) (2012).
248. Recent histories of the Foreign Relations of the United States series (“FRUS”) and the State
Department’s Office of the Historian are Kristin L. Ahlberg, Building a Model Public History Program:
The Office of the Historian at the U.S. Department of State, 30 Pub. Historian 9 (2008); Joshua Botts,
FRUS at 150, Office of the Historian, Dep’t of State (2011), http://www.archives.gov.il/
NR/rdonlyres/18E1895D-A15E-405F-B4EE-91FE56C7CF65/0/FRUS150Nov29.pdf (reprinting an essay
presented at the 11th International Conference of Editors of Diplomatic Documents).
249. See Botts, supra note 248, at 15–27 (describing conflicts over FRUS during the Cold War).
250. See Richard W. Leopold, The Foreign Relations Series: A Centennial Estimate, 49 Miss. Valley
Hist. Rev. 595, 607–09 (1963); Page Putnam Miller, We Can’t Yet Read Our Own Mail: Access to the
Records of the Department of State, in A Culture of Secrecy 189–94 (Athan G. Theoharis ed., 1998).
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251

documents on a scheduled basis. Congress’ interest in FRUS was itself
part of broader legislative efforts to advance the declassification of
252
documents concerning particularly controversial historical events.
253
Another statute, the Presidential Records Act (the “PRA”),
clarified an uneven and informal practice of making the papers of a
254
departing President publicly available. Enacted at the tail end of the
post-Watergate period of open government statutes, the PRA addressed
the issue that arose from former President Nixon’s efforts to control the
documents from his presidency, when it became clear both that former
presidents could not be trusted to allow public access to their historical
255
papers and that there was wide public demand for such access. The
statute allows for public access to presidential records through the FOIA
beginning five years after the end of the administration, but allows the
President to invoke as many as six specific restrictions to public access
256
for up to twelve years.
These efforts to open the historical record have faced significant
resistance. Every struggle over the receding past takes place in the
shadow both of an underlying constitutional conflict over presidential
257
privilege, and of the bureaucratic barriers that the classification system
258
creates. The FRUS volumes have come more slowly and sporadically as
a result of such battles, especially due to long delays in declassifying
259
documents. At the same time, the PRA does not provide unfettered
access to the historical record. Presidential records continue to fall within
251. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 102-138, § 198, 105 Stat. 647, 685-691 (1991)
(codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 4351–57); Botts, supra note 248, at 29–31; see Philip G. Schrag, Working
Papers as Federal Records: The Need for New Legislation to Preserve the History of National Policy,
46 Admin. L. Rev. 95, 139 n.248 (1994).
252. See, e.g., Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 105-246, 112 Stat. 1859 (1998);
President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-526,
106 Stat. 3443 (1992).
253. Presidential Records Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-591, 92 Stat. 2523 (codified as amended at
44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–07 (2000)).
254. On the history of presidential papers before the PRA, see Jonathan Turley, Presidential
Papers and Popular Government: The Convergence of Constitutional and Property Theory in Claims of
Ownership and Control of Presidential Records, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 651, 657–66 (2003)
255. See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 445–46 n.8, 483–84 (1977) (upholding against
constitutional challenge a pre-PRA statute focused solely on President Nixon’s records).
256. 44 U.S.C. § 2204 (2012).
257. See, e.g., George Bush, Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1992 and 1993 (Oct. 28, 1991), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=20152
(explicitly declaring the President’s constitutional prerogative over diplomatic information statement
upon signing the bill authorizing the FRUS).
258. Anne Van Camp, Trying to Write “Comprehensive and Accurate” History of the Foreign
Relations of the United States: An Archival Perspective, in Archives and the Public Good, supra note
68, at 229, 241. (noting the key role of the State Department and other agencies in delaying the
issuance of FRUS volumes).
259. Botts, supra note 248, at 30–31.
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FOIA’s exceptions even after the twelve-year period that allows former
260
presidents to place additional restrictions on public access. Presidential
administrations also vary in the extent of their willingness to comply with
261
the statute’s spirit and letter. The legal and bureaucratic machinery of
secrecy can, at least in theory, continue to hide the state’s covert actions.
B. Guatemala’s Secret History
As in the other case studies in this Article, however, the executive
branch’s ability to exercise control over the flow of information by
overriding formal legislative efforts to open archives is itself frequently
undercut by informal means. In the case of information about past
American covert operations—among the most controversial and
secretive acts in which the nation’s intelligence community, diplomatic
corps, and military engage—informal disclosure occurs because the
operations inevitably have real-world effects that leave a public record
and create a public memory where the operation took place.
The struggle over information about American involvement in
Guatemalan history perfectly illustrates this dynamic. The CIA’s covert
operation resulting in the 1954 coup that deposed the popularly elected
Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz became the model for many
similar secret interventions that followed, including the failed Bay of Pigs
invasion in Cuba in 1961, and the operation had long-term devastating
262
effects on Guatemala’s political and social stability. Although direct
and extensive American involvement in the coup was widely recognized
263
throughout Latin America and Europe at the time and subsequently,
the Eisenhower administration portrayed the coup as a popular

260. 44 U.S.C. § 2204(c)(1) (2012). On FOIA’s exceptions, see supra notes 48–52 and
accompanying text.
261. Compare Exec. Order No. 13,233, 3 C.F.R. 13233 (2001), 44 USC § 2204 (2012) (printing
George W. Bush executive order allowing former presidents to withhold records as privileged after the
twelve year moratorium with the concurrence of the incumbent President), with Exec. Order
No. 13,489, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,669 (Jan. 26, 2009) (publishing Obama’s revocation of Bush’s order). See
generally Laurent Sacharoff, Former Presidents and Executive Privilege, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 301, 352
(2009); Marcy Lynn Karin, Note, Out of Sight, But Not Out of Mind: How Executive Order 13,233
Expands Executive Privilege While Simultaneously Preventing Access to Presidential Records, 55 Stan.
L. Rev. 529, 548–52 (2002).
262. See Michael Grow, U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions ix–x (2008);
Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala 186–201 (1982); John H. Coatsworth, Introduction to
Stephen Schlesinger & Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in
Guatemala xv (2005). American involvement, and the CIA’s denial of its own involvement in
atrocities in Guatemala and efforts to cover it up, continued into the Clinton administration. See
Richard A. Nuccio, Foreword to the 1999 Edition of Stephen Schlesinger & Stephen Kinzer, Bitter
Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala xxii–xxvi (1999).
263. See Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of Its Operations in
Guatemala, 1952–1954 at 111–13, 119 (1999).
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Guatemalan uprising and, with the complicity of U.S. news editors and
publishers, kept the CIA’s role relatively secret from the American
264
public. The coup continues to float in a kind of historical twilight, at
once well-known in Latin America and among historians and Americans
well-versed in Central American history, but shrouded in the
impenetrable mystery that clings to controversial CIA Cold War covert
operations. Numerous monographs on Guatemalan history, memoirs
from coup participants, and books that treat covert American
interventions in the post-war era more broadly have brought the
American role in sponsoring and assisting the coup to at least some
265
light. Nevertheless, several historians have complained that the event’s
266
details have been lost or remain locked inside government archives.
Historians’ work has been made more difficult because the CIA’s
267
files remained off-limits to researchers into the 1990s, not least because
a 1983 FRUS volume, putatively concerning Guatemala, included no
268
documents suggesting CIA involvement in the coup. In 1992, however,
as part of an “openness” initiative following the Soviet Union’s
269
collapse, the CIA commissioned Nick Cullather, a recently-minted
history Ph.D. and new member of the agency’s History Staff, to use full
access to the Agency’s classified files to write an insider history of the
CIA’s role in the 1954 coup. The Agency intended the resulting account
to serve as a training manual for future covert operatives rather than as a
full or official account of the operation; nevertheless, the Agency
planned ultimately to release Cullather’s text to the public, along with
270
some of the documents on which Cullather relied. The openness
proved temporary, however, and Cullather’s report, completed in 1993,
remained classified until it was declassified and deposited in the National

264. Immerman, supra note 262, at 4–5; Schlesinger & Kinzer, supra note 262, at 153–56 (2005).
For an account of how the CIA and State Department persuaded the New York Times to stop
reporting on the coup in order to keep the CIA’s involvement from Americans, see Harrison E.
Salisbury, Without Fear or Favor 478–83 (1980).
265. See Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United
States 1944–1954 (1991); E. Howard Hunt & Greg Aunapu, American Spy 59–84 (2007); Immerman,
supra note 262; David Atlee Phillips, The Night Watch 34–54 (1977); Schlesinger & Kinzer, supra
note 262.
266. Gleijeses, supra note 265, at 4; Coatsworth, supra note 262, at xi.
267. One of the earliest critical histories of United States’ involvement in the 1954 coup relied
heavily on documents received via the FOIA—although, notably, not from the CIA, which refused to
make disclosures under FOIA. See Schlesinger & Kinzer, supra note 262, at xxxvii (2005).
268. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Guatemala, Office of the Historian,
Dep’t of State (2003), http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat.
269. See James X. Dempsey, The CIA and Secrecy, in A Culture of Secrecy, supra note 250, at
53–55 (discussing the CIA’s interest in openness in the early 1990s).
270. Cullather, supra note 263, at vii–ix, xiv.
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271

Archives in 1997. Stanford University Press subsequently published it
in 1999 with the title Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of Its
Operations in Guatemala, 1952–1954, retaining the same redactions the
272
CIA had made upon the manuscript’s declassification.
In theory, Secret History could constitute a milestone text in the
disclosure of American Cold War secrets—an institutional CIA history
of a key covert operation that had proved enormously influential, not
only in Guatemala, but throughout the Western Hemisphere, while it has
remained largely unknown to most Americans. Through no fault of
Cullather, however, it did not. The declassified version of his manuscript
was extensively redacted, with not only names but also parts of the
operation removed—including, ironically, a passage on how the
Eisenhower administration kept news of the CIA’s involvement in the
273
coup secret from Americans. The scope of Cullather’s assigned project
did not lend itself to serving as a comprehensive history anyway, and the
documentary release that the CIA originally stated would accompany
274
Cullather’s report included a limited amount of materials. Secret
History only serves as a partial disclosure, then, because the bureaucratic
apparatus of the clandestine service appears to have proven capable of
retaining history’s secrets long after the Guatemala coup it engineered.
Indeed, the historic record remains contested regarding details,
personal identities, and especially the larger historiographical questions
regarding American motives and the relative moral purity of the nation’s
275
intent. Was the United States motivated by the desire to protect the
United Fruit Company, a powerful American corporation, from
276
nationalization and land reform? Or to save Guatemala from communist
277
and especially Soviet influence? Or simply to protect national, and
278
perhaps neo-colonial, American interests? These questions remain
“secret,” in the sense that answers, if they exist, may lie buried in some file
cabinet in CIA headquarters. Having incrementally increased the
historical record, Cullather’s account provided confirmation about some
aspects of existing historical hypotheses but could not rule out competing

271. Nicholas Cullather, Operation PBSUCCESS: The United States and Guatemala 1952–
1954 (1994).
272. Cullather, supra note 263, at iii–xv, xvii.
273. Id. at 119. See generally Robert Shaffer, The 1954 Coup in Guatemala and the Teaching of
U.S. Foreign Relations, Passport (2004), available at http://www.shafr.org/old/teaching/Shaffer1.pdf.
274. Cullather, supra note 263, at xiv–xv; Press Release, Ctr. for the Study of Intelligence,
Release of Records on 1952–54 Guatemala Covert Actions (May 23, 1997) (on file with Author).
275. See Richard H. Immerman, Book Review, 106 Am. Hist. Rev. 605, 605 (2001) (reviewing
Cullather, supra note 263).
276. See Schlesinger & Kinzer, supra note 262, at 106 (2005).
277. See Immerman, supra note 262, at 68, 82.
278. See Gleijeses, supra note 265, at 7.
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ones or lay bare the full truth. Viewed this way, the secrecy apparatus
won—some of the operational specifics and the larger motivations of the
Guatemala coup remain as obscure today as they were in the coup’s
280
immediate aftermath.
But this view of Secret History and the Guatemala coup is incomplete
for two reasons, each of which should be familiar by this point in the
Article. Despite the CIA’s broad use of its classification authority, general
and specific information about American involvement was immediately
281
and throughout Western
available and known within Guatemala
282
Europe, and it became more widely known in the United States through
incidental disclosures and responses to FOIA requests beginning in the
283
1970s. The intervening decades have seen the disclosure of more
information. In 2003, nearly fifty years after the coup, the State
Department issued a FRUS volume with a more expansive collection of
documents about the coup, and the CIA has made thousands of
284
documents (many of them redacted) available on its website. Additional
documents had previously come to light during Guatemala’s truth and
reconciliation process, in aid of which the Clinton administration
declassified thousands of documents and the National Security Archive
produced a documentary history tracing American involvement in
285
Guatemala from the coup through the 1990s. Formal and informal
mechanisms of information disclosure and circulation have curtailed the
secrecy that elements of the state continue to try to impose.
Secret History has therefore become part of the broader unveiling of
the secret history of the U.S. role in Guatemala’s 1954 coup, some of
which has been the consequence of official state action. Much of the
286
CIA’s prized secret history was in fact not secret. This is not to defend
the CIA’s effort to keep secrets, nor is it to deny the value of disclosure
279. See generally Stephen M. Streeter, Interpreting the U.S. Intervention in Guatemala: Realist,
Revisionist, and Postrevisionist Perspectives, 34 Hist. Tchr. 61 (2000).
280. See Immerman, supra note 275 (complaining of the CIA’s “behavior” in refusing to release
unredacted versions of classified documents that could conceivably resolve significant historical
disputes).
281. See Gleijeses, supra note 265, at 3–7.
282. See Sharon I. Meers, The British Connection: How the United States Covered Its Tracks in the
1954 Coup in Guatemala, 16 Diplomatic Hist. 409, 419, 422–23 (1992).
283. Cullather, supra note 263, at 119–23; Schlesinger & Kinzer, supra note 262, at ix–xi, xxxvii–
viii (2005).
284. See Guatemala, Cent. Intelligence Agency, http://www.foia.cia.gov/guatemala.asp; see also
Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA 562 (2007); Foreign Relations of the United
States, supra note 268.
285. See Nat’l Security Archive, Death Squads, Guerrilla War, Covert Operations, and
Genocide: Guatemala and the United States, 1954–1999 (Guatemala and the U.S.) (2000);
William Clinton, Remarks in a Roundtable Discussion on Peace Efforts in Guatemala City, March 10,
1999, in 1 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton 340 (1999).
286. See Immerman, supra note 275.
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and the more complete picture that further access to documents can
bring. The CIA’s resistance to making the historical record of its
operations available to the public within a reasonable period of time is
inexcusable. But my argument has been that secrecy proves much more
difficult to maintain than its proponents assume. The CIA could only
exert its full control over its own secret history, not the history to which
the public gained access through other sources and authorities. At the
same time, its secrecy merely increased the CIA’s mythological status in
the United States as a preeminent tool of American foreign policy, and
287
its status elsewhere as a representative of American imperialism. If
most Americans remain ignorant of their nation’s sordid history in
Guatemala, the cause is as much ideological as it is the public’s difficulty
288
in obtaining information about it.
In the second edition of Secret History, published in 2006, Cullather
suggests a second way that secrecy has proven implausible. In explaining
his decision to keep the original redactions imposed by the CIA
untouched, even though he could have inserted them with information
gleaned from open sources, Cullather wrote:
I have received more compliments on the eloquence of the gaps than
on any of the legible passages. Readers have found they can check
their speculations for fit, and search the blank spaces for clues on the
aspects of the operation that the agency, even after 50 years, prefers to
289
cloak in “plausible deniability.

Redactions might impose secrecy, Cullather’s readers told him, but
they do not foreclose the effort—informed by other sources—to find the
hidden meaning that the state has tried to conceal. “Eloquence” suggests
that the empty spaces speak both of the missing content and of what
290
those empty spaces say about the state that has removed their content.
Secrecy law and practice can render history “secret,” but it cannot fully
291
control historical information, practice, and knowledge. It may keep

287. On the CIA’s mythological status both before and after the mid-1970s disclosure of the
checkered history of its covert operations, see Olmsted, supra note 246, at 13–15, 186–89.
288. See Timothy Melley, The Covert Sphere 13 (2012).
289. Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of its Operations in
Guatemala ix (2d ed. 2006).
290. The CIA’s redactions of Cullather’s original manuscript literally erased text and left square
brackets surrounding empty space; the university press edition repeated this technique.
291. The Guatemala case is not unique. After the State Department refused to allow
declassification of certain documents related to British Guyana, New York Times journalist Tim
Weiner discovered the nature of the classified materials by using open source materials not subject to
classification. His investigation revealed the existence of an American covert operation, ordered by
President Kennedy, to unseat the nation’s democratically elected leader. See Tim Weiner, A KennedyC.I.A. Plot Returns to Haunt Clinton, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1994, at A10; see also Colin A. Palmer,
Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power 246–69 (2010); Stephen G. Rabe, U.S. Intervention in
British Guiana: A Cold War Story 151–73 (2005); see Weiner, supra note 284, at 191–92, 591–92
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parts of the state veiled, but it reveals the state’s efforts to veil itself—
and in the process reveals the United States’ antidemocratic tendencies.

Conclusion
Deep, long-lasting secrecy proves quite difficult to accomplish in
practice. The formal legal limits on secrecy, as well as the informal means
by which information flows out of the state, perform the crucial service of
making the state more visible. We should not, however, mistake this
movement of information for “transparency,” or even for a step towards
a gloriously transparent state. As this Article has argued elsewhere, we
can never achieve a perfectly visible government—and, in fact, we would
292
not even want one if it were achievable. The concept of “transparency,”
like the concept of “secrecy,” assumes the law’s ability to control
information, an assumption belied by decades of frustrating experience
293
with open government laws. Both concepts are implausible.
This is no reason to despair. This Conclusion notes three implications
of this implausibility for understanding and responding to government
secrecy: (1) recognizing it as a political practice subject to political
accountability, (2) conceding law’s limits as a means to control
information, and (3) developing legal reforms that can hasten official
disclosure.
First, secrecy is paradoxically a very public issue, and one for which
excessively secretive officials can be held politically accountable. As
Cheney has himself noted, secrecy can not only fail, revealing the
information it sought to hide, but can also be exposed and criticized as an
undemocratic practice. In the “leaky city” of the nation’s capitol, Cheney
wrote in an essay published three years after completion of the
congressional investigation of Iran-Contra, no secret stays buried too
294
long, and no president’s failed cover-ups go unpunished. Indeed, the
Minority Report itself conceded that President Reagan was forced “to
pay a stiff political price” not only for his appointees’ illegal actions in
Iran-Contra, but also for their secrecy and attempted concealment of the
295
program. The more secrets, and the deeper they are kept, the greater
the risk that the President takes in keeping them—a risk that can prove
(describing history that may have been secret in the United States, but was widely known in Guyana);
See generally Festus Brotherson, Jr., The Foreign Policy of Guyana, 1970–1985: Forbes Burnham’s
Search for Legitimacy, 31 J. Interamerican Stud. & World Aff. 9 (1989) (recounting this history in an
academic article in 1989); Weiner, supra note 284 (quoting the president defeated in part through
American intervention in the election, as stating that, “[e]verybody in Guyana knows what
happened”).
292. Fenster, Seeing the State, supra note 177, at 671–72.
293. Fenster, Opacity, supra note 28, at 914–19.
294. Cheney, supra note 148, at 116.
295. Iran-Contra Affair Report, supra note 148, at 452.
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effective as an alternative to formal laws and legal proceedings in
disciplining the executive branch. Such political costs cannot replace the
formal legal limitations on secrecy that open government laws (not to
mention, for criminal conspiracies and perjury, criminal laws) provide,
but they serve as a mechanism by which the informal limits on secrecy
can punish wrongdoers.
This understanding of secrecy as a tool that has potential political
costs suggests a more foundational informal check on information control.
296
If “[t]he cover up is worse than the crime,” as the conventional wisdom
teaches about Watergate, then secrecy appears to have an ethical
dimension based upon a widely-shared, intuitive distinction between
legitimate and illegitimate secrecy. Although it lacks precise meaning, the
concept of “transparency” functions as a nearly universal liberal
democratic value, as is the notion that some secrets are too dangerous to a
297
nation and society to warrant disclosure. Partisans might disagree about
whether an individual instance of secrecy is excessive, but in doing so
they must frame their arguments in widely-acknowledged and used
terms. The NEPDG episode illustrates this well: NEPDG’s policy
development process appeared absurdly secretive, as opponents and
even members of the administration noted, and its secrecy provided the
298
administration no political benefit and likely exacted political costs.
The more significant and pervasive secrecy that followed in the Bush
administration’s post-9/11 anti-terrorism campaign, which the NEPDG
episode launched and rehearsed, proved more temporarily effective at
controlling information. But information about many of the
administration’s programs ultimately leaked to the public over the course
of the administration’s second term, from the torture of prisoners and
299
detainees to the warrantless wiretaps of domestic communications. By
the end of the Bush presidency, the administration—and especially
Cheney—had become quite politically unpopular, at least partially
because of the seemingly unethical nature of excessive secrecy. Barack
Obama explicitly included open government as a platform in his 2008
campaign, in part to contrast himself with the Bush-Cheney White
300
House. The first implication of secrecy’s implausibility, then, is that it

296. David Johnston, Coverup: Watergate’s Toughest Lesson, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1998, at SR5
(“Watergate bequeathed many things to history, including this famous cliche: The cover-up is worse
than the crime. Politicians haven’t necessarily absorbed this lesson, but the legal system has.”); Frank
Rich, We’re Not in Watergate Anymore, N.Y. Times, July 10, 2005, at SR12 (“[T]he most basic lesson of
Watergate: [T]he cover-up is worse than the crime.”)
297. Fenster, Seeing the State, supra note 177, at 624–26.
298. See discussion supra notes 188–194.
299. Baker, supra note 59.
300. For further discussion on Cheney and Bush’s unpopularity following the end of the Bush
presidency, see Lydia Saad, Little Change in Negative Images of Bush and Cheney, Gallup Pol.
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reveals the political nature of information control, and it demonstrates
how politics serves both as a key motivation to use secrecy and as a
301
crucial check on its overuse. It also reveals the necessity of these
informal means of secrecy, and the importance of avoiding draconian
302
303
leak laws and excessive prosecution of those who do leak.
A second implication of secrecy’s implausibility is the shift it
suggests for the study of secrecy and transparency away from a binary,
black-and-white conception of the state as either open and transparent or
closed and opaque. As Part V illustrated in its description of historic
covert operations, events that are kept in deep secrecy become known as
their details leak out over time, whether through formal or informal
channels. Most events exist in a gray world of partial secrecy and partial
disclosure, where even information about events whose existence the
304
government denies is available from open sources, and where even
events about which the government has made broad disclosures remain
305
somewhat secret and mysterious. Government information is not
subject to control via an on-off switch; instead, it appears incrementally
over time, both around and in spite of the literal and figurative black
marks of government efforts to control its spread.
Third, and as a consequence of the shift from a binary understanding
of secrecy and disclosure, legal reform should focus on temporal
commitments to disclosure that force the state to recognize the decreasing
value of once-secret information and require the state, as a default duty, to
306
release documents after a certain interval. This would formalize and
(Apr. 3, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/117250/Little-Change-Negative-Images-Bush-Cheney.aspx.
For further discussion on their current unpopularity, see George E. Condon Jr., Romney Embraces
Cheney, Sort Of, Nat’l J. (July 17, 2012), http://nationaljournal.com/politics/romney-embraces-cheneysort-of-20120717. For further discussion on Obama’s campaign, see Fenster, Seeing the State, supra
note 177, at 624–25.
301. I make this point more explicitly in Fenster, Transparency Fix, supra note 24.
302. See generally Jennifer K. Elsea, Cong. Research Serv., R41404, Criminal Prohibitions on
the Publication of Classified Defense Information 26–30 (2013) (discussing recently proposed
legislation that would expand criminal liability for leaks).
303. For further discussion on the Obama administration’s excessive leak prosecutions, see Liptak,
supra note 8; Josh Gerstein, Despite Openness Pledge, President Obama Pursues Leakers, Politico
(Mar. 7, 2011, 4:40 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0311/50761.html; Shane Harris, Plugging
the Leaks, Washingtonian (July 21, 2010), http://www.washingtonian.com/articles/people/plugging-theleaks. For an argument about the cyclical, largely symbolic nature of anti-leak campaigns in a political
system that requires leaks, see Pozen, supra note 85.
304. One famous example of this phenomenon is the case of the Glomar Explorer, a ship that the
CIA attempted to use to recover a sunken Soviet nuclear submarine whose existence the CIA
continued to try to keep secret despite numerous leaks and front-page stories in major newspapers.
See Matthew Aid et al., Project Azorian: The CIA’s Declassified History of the Glomar Explorer,
Nat’l Sec. Archive (Feb. 12, 2010), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb305.
305. See supra notes 268–280 and accompanying text.
306. See Fenster, Opacity, supra note 28, at 942–45; James A. Goldston et al., A Nation Less
Secure: Diminished Public Access to Information, 21 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 409, 486 (1986).
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hasten a process that is likely to occur in any event. Laws and regulations
have moved in this direction, albeit with varying degrees of success. These
include the mandatory declassification of most documents after a certain
time period under the current Executive Order establishing the
307
classification system, and the staged release of presidential documents
308
under the PRA.
The fact that neither commitment has proven entirely successful
suggests (as ever) the stubborn tendency of the administrative state and
the constitutional privilege granted to the executive to resist the
309
disclosure of information. Recall, however, the formal and informal
means that enable a President and executive branch to control
310
information in certain circumstances for a period of time. This
authority, whose logic is entrenched in the Constitution, will not
disappear. If they are properly implemented and enforced, time-based
reforms can help compel the regular release of records and force the
executive branch to recognize disclosure’s inevitability. Law can neither
perfect secrecy nor cure its excesses, but—working in a manner
consistent with secrecy’s implausibility and the difficulty of information
control—it might ameliorate some of its ill effects.

307. Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 3.3(a), 75 Fed. Reg. 707, 714 (Dec. 29, 2009) (requiring
declassification of documents more than twenty-five years old that are determined to have “permanent
historical value,” subject to limitations). This executive order, issued by President Obama, revived the
automatic declassification program established first by President Clinton. See Exec. Order No. 12,958,
§ 3.4, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825, 19,832 (Apr. 17, 1995), as amended Exec. Order No. 13,142, 64 Fed. Reg.
66,089 (Nov. 19, 1999). For a summary of the Clinton program, see Amanda Fitzsimmons, National
Security or Unnecessary Secrecy? Restricting Exemption 1 to Prohibit Reclassification of Information
Already in the Public Domain, 4 I/S: J. L. & Pol’y for Info. Soc’y 479, 486–87 (2008). The concept
itself dates back at least to the Pentagon Papers era. See Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The
Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense Information, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 929, 1045 n.450 (1973);
Louis Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 120 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 271, 280 (1971).
308. See supra notes 253–261 and accompanying text.
309. On the problems with existing automatic and mandatory declassification programs, see Steven
Aftergood, Declassification Advances, But Will Miss Goal, Secrecy News (July 20, 2012),
http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2012/07/miss_goal.html; Steven Aftergood, NARA Proposes New Rule
on Declassification, Secrecy News (July 11, 2011), http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2011/07/
nara_declass.html.
310. See supra Parts I, II.

